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I. THE NEED FOR PRESERVATION
A. IJuroduetio'n
This paper will examine the different legislative
schemes that have been oreated in New England for the
proteot ion of ooastal wetlands '. It will assess how
they have worked in praotioe, both with respeot to their
administration and the judioial response to them, and
will outline the arguments for and against upholding
restriotions on the use of wetlands under the legislation.
Coastal wetlands legislation in New England,l in
general, creates a permit system whereby anyone wishing
to change the existing state of a wetland must apply
to the proper authorities for permission to oarry out
the proposed activity. Although there is some provision
for applioable state agencies to desi.gnate areaS as
wetlands, thus restricting their use before any permit
is requested, the legislation disoussed here does not
really focus on oreating any planning mechanism to
balance all the interests invo'lved and ensure that
wetlands are used properly. 'Of course, in deciding
whether to grant a permit or not, the regulatory body
Should take into account the competing uses for the
land involved and the spillover effects of the proposed
-1-
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activity, but the general thrust of the legislative
concern expressed in the statutes is preservation.
For unlike other parts of the coastal zone, wetlands,
once destroyed', cannot be recreat,ed. They are unique l
natural phenomena, formed over many, many years like
other parts of the coastal zone. Whil,e a motel built
on a scenic headland may be torn down and a park created
in its place, once a wetland has been filled or dredged,
there is little that can be done to restore the delicate,
natural balance between land and, water, the particular
salinity, temperature, and transparency of the salt
and fresh water, the specific circulation pattern,
flushing time, turbulence and stream inflow that characterize
any productive wetland. 2
When increasing public conc,ern for the coastal
z.on,e so often focuses on the more visible aspects- of
oil pollution, land development and over.crowded recre-
ational facilities,) and on the general need for overall
planning,4 it might be wondered Why wetlands, in particular,
have been the subject of protective legislation and
of this study. What are commonly thought to be just
"swamps" are not considered very useful for recreation,
housing or other forms of economic development in their
natural state. Until recently they were thought fit
only for filling. But, the fact is, as any informed
-3-
citizen must now recognize, wetlands are very valuable
to all of us for a variety of reasons that will be
outlined below. S It is because tbeir importance, uniqueness
and vulnerability have been increasingly recognized
that wetlands have been protected in all i1 ve, coastal
New England stat,es, whereas other areas of concern
in the coastal zone have not yet received full legislative
attention. Because there has'be'en enough time for
some litigation over ~his legislation to be decided,
and becau~e the administrative procedures have had
a chance to be refined, it is now p~ssible to make
an analysis of the effectiveness of this wetlands legisla~
tion. Since wetlands are but one, albeit important,
part of the whole coastal zone. what we can learn from
the attempts to control their development may be useful
ae we turn 'to devising wider controls. Much more of
the New England coastal zone than wetlands needs to
be protected from the ravages of uncontrolled human
development if it is to survive into the twenty-first
century, able to play the same vital commercial, recreation~
al and ecological role that it has in the last three
hundred years.
New England is a good area to study because of
its leadership in the field and its regional character.
Massachusetts waS the first state to pass a wetlands
-4-
law,6 and New England was the first multistate region
in the country to be protected by legislation in this
area. Thus, there are five legislative schemes to
examine, different in detail, yet basically similar.
New England already exists as a recognized regional
unit, with functioning, regional governmental institutions.?
Although the need for and the problems with regional
government cannot be discussed in any detail in this
paper, preservation of the coastal zone, just as any
other pollution problem, is no respecter of governmental
boundaries. The complex interrelatedness of the ecologi-
cal factors involved, which in turn influence commerce
and recreation, transcend state lines. Maine's problem
is New Hampshire's, and so on down the coast. Just
as the New England states have borrowed from each
other in tackling wetland preservation, so they may
learn from each other's experiences in regulating
wetlands how to attack the much more complex task
of regulating the whole coastal z,one.
B. What are wetlands qDd why are they important?
"Wetlands" is, used in this paper as a comprehensive
term to cover the areas designed to be protected by
-5'"
the various pieces of legislati,on. But the differences
in the actual legislative definitions are significant.
Th.ey indicate, differences in attitude towards what
it is that should be preserved, and of course they
delineate the extent of administrative control. As
we shall see shortly,8certain types of wetlands, particu-
larly salt marshes, are extremely prOductive areas.
Rhode Island I s definition covers only t'hose areas as
well as "such uplands contiguouS' thereto, but extending
no more than fifty (50) yards inland therefrom, as
the director [of the Department of Natural Resources]
shall deem reasonably necessary to protect such salt
marshes.. ,.9 It, along with Connecticut lO and New
Hampshire,ll shows some sophistication in scientific
understanding by including in its definition a list
of vegetation--various grasses for the most part--that
12is capable of growing on the land intended to be included.
But Connecticut and New HampShire do not just include
salt marshes. Along with Maine l ) and Massachusetts,14
whOSe definitions do not have th·e same scientific content,
their legislation covers all areas bordering tidal
waters. Thus, with the exception of Rhode Island,
the New England s~ates seek not only to preserve productive
wetlands, i.. e •• salt marshes, but also beaches " ledges,
flats, or any other parts of the shore from uncontrolled
-6-
change or development. 15
However ~hey ar~ described, it is only recently
that the general pUblic has begun to app:I"leciate the
importance of wetlands remaining in their natural state.
Their appeal to the developer has been obvious for
some time. They are unused, and thus probably cheap,
pieces of land that can be filled in to create often
choice sites for residential or commercial development.
Perhaps, .like so many of th.is country!s naturally abundant
resources, their value' has been recognized to some
degree, but because of their vast extent they have
never been thought to need protection. But .as the
rate of their destruction has become increasingly apparent,
as the absolute number of wetlands has decreased, and
as scientists have come to understand more fully the
complexi ty and interrelated quality of our world" s
natural environment, people have looked more carefully
at the function and uses of wetlands.
Accurate figures of the rate of destruction are
impossible to obtain, because of the differences in
definitio'n, but oonservative e·stimates are that the nation
lost more than 25% of its wetlands - over two million
acres - in the 32 years between 1932 and 1954r W~ssachu­
setts has lost about 20% over its history. Connecticut
lost over 12% between 1954 and 1964, while the other
-7-
New England. states have lost between 1% and 5% in that
time .16 These figures, however, do not include the IQsS,
of productive wetlands from pollution. One indication
of the combined effects of pollution and the filling of
wetlands on shellfish alone is that while Connecticut
averaged a ,shellfish harvest of 2,0 million dollars per
year between 1920 and 1960, it onl,y averaged 1.5 million
dollars between 1955 and 1971. 17
The scientific evidence is indisputable that
wetlands per~orm many invaluable services for mankind.
First, they provide nutrients for a host of marine
and land based species - fish, shellfish, animals and
birds. Wetlands are among the most productive areas
on earth, producing about 10 tons of organic matter,
chiefly grasses, per acre, per year, compared with
the world's best Wheat fields' 7 tons, a hay field's
4 tons, and the coastal waters' 1 to 1.5 tons. As
one scientist has described its
Estuaries in general and salt marshes in
particular are unusually productive places.
None of the commercial agriculture, except
possibly rice and sugar cane production, comes
close to producing as much potential animal
food as do the salt marshes, The agricultural
crops Which approach this high figure are
-8-
ferti.lized and cultivated! at great expense.
The marsh is fertilized and cultivated only
by the. tides. 18
The complex. process by which this vegetation is broken
down into substances usable by the smallest marine
organisms, which in turn provide food for larger species
by means of their excretions., is both delicate. and
crucial to the continued existence of some two-thirds
of the annual commercial fishing harvest of the east
coast of the United States. 19 Obviously it is difficult
to reach any firm oonclusions on the monetary value
of individual wetlands, but the Maine· Department of
Environmental Protection cites the following values
for average yields per acre in 19731 sea moss - $3200,
soft-shelled clams - $1885, hard-shelled clams - $14,680,
shrimp - $2137, and marine worms - $8680. 20 As one
commentator has pointed out, the average value of
wetlands in Maine is more than the average' value of
land. 21
While the economic importance of wetlands is
perhaps most easily seen when related to fishing -
both commercial and recreationa122 - wetlands also are
major habitats for a wide variety of species of animals
and birds, thus helping to provid"e the variety in nature
that is thought to be beneficial for the control of
pests y Wetlands play an important role in coastal
flood control and i'n preventing the erosion. of land by
acting as buffers to the sea pounding against the shore,
dispersing the sea~s power among a m¥Taid of channels and
preventing one section of land from taking the full brunt
of the water' s force. Wet,lands damaged by storms can
rebuild themselves naturally while man-made struetures
cannot. Wetlands help reduce the silting of estuaries
by taking in large amounts of sediment from the sea. The
same bacteria that break down the vegetation and the
excretions of the lower marine organisms also serve as
water purifiers. They break down the discnarge of
secondary s,ewerage treatment plants and thus help to
alleviate pollution. In supporting vegetation that Can
grow in saline conditions, which occur on land in many
places of the world, wetlands may also prove to be a
source of food in the future. 2)
Finally, wetlands provide a unique open space
that serves, not only as a living laboratory for scien-
tists, but as a general recreational f,acility f'or us
all. It is increasingly important that we leave areas
of this shrinking planet alone, not only to provide their
rich variety of foods and habitats to a host of Wildlife,
but also to give us places where we can experience a
sense of ease and renewa.l by interacting With the natural
life that goes on, so often unseen, all around our con-
trolled and mechanized environment.
-10-
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
A. !h§ Eyolui~Qn Qf' the Pre§eni Legislation ~d
Legislative Findings
While all the states now have legislation setting
forth the scientific, cQmmercial O~ recreational value
of wetlands, at least implicitly, this recognition has
only occurred within the last decade or so as the realization
Qf the importance of wetlands has grown. Massachusetts
passed its permit scheme fQr dredging or filling wetlands
in 1963,24 and the stat-ute prQviding for the pr.otection
of wetlands by administrative orders of the Department
of Natural Resources 25 in 1965_ Rhode Island set up a
s,imilar permit sy,stem26 and mad~ it a cttIilinal offense
to disturb wetlan~s without a permit27 in that same
year. Maine and New Hampshire passed their permit schemes 28
in 1967. Connecticut had regulated the removal of sand
and gravel from tidal waters29 before' 196) and in that
year added legislation. regulating the erection of struc-
ture.s within tidal waters. 30 In 1969, it set up a permit
system to regulate dredging and filling, declaring
"that the remaining wetlands of this state are all
in j·e,opardy of being lost or despoiled by these and
other activities. uJ1
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The expressions of legislative concern include
constitutional provisions in Massachusetts and Rhode
Island relating to the environment in general. J2 In
Rhode Island explicit reference is made in the wetlands
statute3; to the state's constitutional guarantee of
"the free right of fishery," 'and the statute contains
a clea_r and detcailed statement of the correlation between
t~e productivity of wetlands and the well-being of
the fishing indus,try and of the value of wetlands as
flood control devices. Connecticut's wetland statute,34,
and New Hampshire's.J5 which followed Connecticut's
by one year and contains much of the same language,
are equally as sophisticated in their comprehension
of the important role of wetlands. The older Maine 36
and Massachusetts statutes J? contain no such explicit
reference to the valuable functions of wetlands. But
that i.s not to say that those states have not recogni~ed
in other ways the crucial importance ,of preserving
the environment in general, Massachusetts' constitutional
amendment has been mentioned. Maine" aside from a
strict site deve~opment act J8 and a mandatory shoreland
zoning act,39 also has a strong oil discharge prevention
and pollution control act with legislative findings
that
the highest and best uses of the
-13-
seacoast of the state are as a sQurce
of pUb~ic and private recreation••.
public use and private commerce in
fis~ing, lobstering and gathering
other marine life •... [and] that the
preservation of these uses is a matter
of the highest urgency and priority •••• 40
More recently, Connecticut and Massachusetts
have passed legislation requiring environmental impact
statements for certain projects that may affect wetlands.
Connecticut· s Environmental Policy Act41 r,equires only
state agencies to submit written statements of the impact
of their activities on the environment, and thus only has
relevance to the protection of wetlands if a state agency,
suCh as the highway department, pr~poses to dredge or
fill. It may be important, however, because its broad
statement of the need to preserve the natural environment
and of the responsibility of the state, as trustee for
the environment, adds to the general legislative finding
of the need for preservation.
The Massachusetts environmental impact statute,42
first passed in 1972, has significantly broader ,require-
ments. As of 1974 it, covers all private activities that
affect natural environmental resources and requires, not
only a statement of the impact of the proposed activity,
-14 ...
but also a discussion of proposed mitigating measures.
It does not contain a strong, general statement, however,
of legislative concern for the preservation of the
natur.al 19nvir·onment. In none of its legislation concerning
wetlands does Massachusetts have more, than a simple
statement that it will regulate them "for the purpose
of promoting pUblic safety, health and welfare, and
protecting public and private property, wildlife and
marine fisherieso.,4J
This omission may have significance for the
argument that permit denia~s or restrictions are police
power regulations and not takings requiring compensation.
The stronger the statement of the legislative purpos.e in
restricting the use of wetlands is, the more successful
the argument may be. The more the legislature indicates
that it has carefully weighed the !l-eed for the preservation
of wet.lands, and thus the need for regulation, and has
found it more important to the public interest than the
uncontrolled right of a property owner to change the
nature of his land, thus causing harm to the environment,
the readier the courts may be to accept that conclusion.
The other states, too, should move to require environ-
mental impact statements for significant public and
private projects, for then it will be clearer to everyone
What the true costs of a project will be. The hitherto
-15'"
unmeasured costs borne by the public will be exposed
for the administrative and jUdicial bodies to see and
weigh.
B. Regulated Actiyit~es
The most generally recognized danger to the preser-
vation of wetlands is uncontrolled dredging or filling. 44
All five states have prohibitions against such activity
without a permit. 45 It is the mos,t destructive form
of alteration and the easiest one for developers to
use to maximize the development potential of the property.
Only Massachusetts and Maine specifically prohibit
46 .pollution in their wetlands statutes., although that
danger is also substantial anQ While less permanent
perhaps" can have severe effects on the producti vity
of a wetland. Connecticut regulates "str,eam channel
encroachments," such as piers, for "the protection
and preservation of the natural resources and ecosyste'ms
of the state, including•. , annual plant, and acquatio
life, [and] nutrient ex-change ...47 Rhode Island gives
~he Director of the Department of Natural Resources
discre~ion as to what activities to restri¢t. 48
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c. ~~rmit App11cation Procedures
1. State Versus Local Authority
All five states have much the Same basic administrative
pattern for issuing dredge or fill permits. Perhaps the
key difference is in how much authority municipalities49
are given. Connecticut and Rhode Is,land give full
authority to the state bOdy.50 New Hampshire gives
a municipality an opportunity to delay the Water Resources
Board's51 public hearing for no more than )0 days for
a local investigation of the issue,52 While if~ine gives
the municipality the initial decision making responsibility
but requires the Board of Environmental Protection5;
to approve ~ny issuance of a permit. 54 Massachusetts
leaves the decision to the municipality with a right
of appeal to the state Department of Natural Resources. 55
Leaving the decision on whether or not to grant
permits to the municipality would seem to invite the
weakening of any state policy to preserve wetlands.
It is precisely because there has been no, general awareness
of the unique value of wetlands that the various state
legislature.s have attempted "to regulate the dredging
and filling of them. Individual communities, continually
pressured by the need to' increase tax rolls, and restricted
by their understandable concern for their own area
-l7~
from seeing the needs of the state as a whole, cannot
be expected to advance the cause of wetlands preservation
at, their own expense ..
On the other hand, the restriction of community
participation to testifying at the public hearing,
as is the case in Connecticut and Rhode Island, raises
serious questions about whether i~ is wise to let the
state have complete authority over the regulation of
lOcal reseurces. As the extent of' state regulation
of the coastal zone increases, local concern will be
an ever growing reality. There has been a particularly
strong history of local participation in conservation
matters in New England. Beginning with Massachusetts
in 1957, all the states, except Maine, have statutes
allowing municipalities to set up conservation commis-
sions. 56 Both Massachusetts and New Hampshire give
the conservation commission, if it exists, an important
role in the permit system procedure, 57 and in all the
states 'municipalities are presumably allowed to set
up their own stricter c0ntrols. 58
Regional planning commissions may be the best
way to retain local input and yet avoid parochialism,.
but they are not yet v.ery developed in N,ew England.
Maine's statute requires the agreement of both the
municipality and the Board of Environmental Protection
-18-
for approval of a permit and gives each a veto power. 59
This solution neither allows a municipality to sabotage
easily the state's poliey of preservation nor prevents
it from active part'icipation in the regulation of
its resources. But it does mean that there ar'e wasteful,
and to the applicant often frustrat.ing, delays and
duplication. In general the l'egislative schemes
have tended to bypass whatever loeal control already
existed, creating a second tier of permits. 60 Such
a system has two major, bureaucratic evilsJ wasteful
duplication and central control with little local
participation. This area is clearly one to which
legislature, local authorities and conservationists
will have to give more thought.
2. Submi~sion of the Application
The permit applications go to the· following
officials: Connecticut - Commissioner of the Department
of Environmental Protectionl Maine - Board of Environ-
mental 'Protection, municipality; Massachusetts - municipal
conservation commission, Department of Natural Resources,
Department of Public Works; New Hampshire ~ Water Resources
Board, town clerk; Rhode IsLand - Director of the Depart~ent
1 - M~ t . 1 61of NattU'al Resources, Coasta Resources 'l'lGlInaeemen Counc·~_.-
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The statutory requirements for the content of
these applications vary only s~ightly. All the states
require the submission of plans, but only ~~ssachusetts
requires the desirable addition of a statement of the
effeots on the environment of the proposed activity.
!t also provides that the conservation commission,
upon the request of anyone, will make a written decision
as to whether a particular piece of land or a project
comes under the permit requirements. Only Connecticut
requires that the application contain the names of
adjacent landowners and claimants o~ water rights known
to th.e applicant and that the app~ication be available
to the public at the office of the Commissioner of
the Department of Environmental Protection. Both items
are highly desirable for efficiency and fairness.
The former helps to ensure that all interested parties
ar-e later notified of any public hearing on the application
by easing the administrative burden of the Department
of Environmental Protection, and the latter gives the
interested public an opportunity to learn o,f the detaIls
of proposals and thus prepare for hearings. Maine
and New Hampshire require that the application be ,filed
60 and )0 days. respectively, before any work commences
,on the proposed activity,62 whereas the other states
unequivocably prohibit dredging or filling without a permit.
...20-
J. PUbliq Hearings
All the states require a public hearing in connection
with applications. 63 In Maine and Massachusetts the hear-
ing is held by the municipality,64 in the other states
by the state agency receiving the application. Maine
and New Hampshire require the hearing to be held within
thirty days of receipt of the application,65 Vassachusetts
within twenty-one, Connecticut between thirty and sixty
days.66 Rhode Island has no time requirement.
The requirements for giving notice of these hear-
ings vary more widely. Surprisingly, Connecticut and Mass-
achusetts are the only states that require notice to be
given at least a certain period of time before the hearing,
and Massachusetts only r,equire s fi ve days. AI~ states
require notice of the hearing to go to some of the follow-
ing. the applicant. 6? either the municipality or the
t t ··1 " 1 d 68 h" h - . ts a e agency pr~marl y ~nvo ve, w 10 ever one ~s no
holding the hearing; abutting owners, and sometimes other
claimants of rights I 69 other selected state agencie's; 70
and newspapers. 71 There would seem to be little r,eason
for any of the states to exclude any of these parties.
None of the statutes give any details as to how
the hearings must be run. In Maine they are, informal
affairs with the state represented only at some by
-21-
the local coastal warden, who at most has little scientific
ex,perience to' offer. If the state Board of Environmental
Protecti~n holds a hearing,72 that will be a more formal
proceeding, governed by the detailed departmental
regulations.?J
4. The Decision
Only Maine and Massachusetts specify that a decision
must be made within a certain period of time. 74 Since
Maine requires approval of both the Board of Environ-
mental Protection and the municipality, the municipality
is required to inform the Board of its decision within
7 days of the hearing, and the permit must be issued
or denied within )0 days of the hearing. 1n Massachusetts
the municipality has 21 days to decide Whether to
impose conditions on the activity proposed.
The allowable grounds for an adverse decision,
where they are specifically set out, follow the general,
legislative purposes of the particular statute. 75 Connec~
ticut adds to the usual ecological and flood control
purposes that a permit may be denied if the Department of
,Environmental Protectton is in the process of acquiring
the land in question. Maine and New Hampshire allOW such
denials if the proposed activity would uadversely affect
the value ~r enjoyment of the property of abutting owners~."
-22-
or "infringe on the property of abutting owners," 76
respectively. As the court decisions indicate,?7 denials
must be specifically related to the concerns expressed
by the legislatures if they are to be upheld. The burden
for making that relationship as t~ght as possible lies
of course on the administrative agency. The statutory
language properly leaves them considerable discretion.
5. Permit Conditions
The extent to which conditions may be imposed
on the issuance of a permit is important. All the states,
at least implicitly, allow a wide discretion in imposing
conditions. 78 If conditions can be imposed and enforced,
many proposed activities may be modified so as not to
conflict with legislative concerns for fisheries, wildlife
and flood control. It is only by reasonable accommQdatioQ
that the coastal zone, including wetlands, can be put to
best use for all the interests concerned. Industry and
change are inevitable, .and insofar as they are planned
for and controlled, desirable. Much depends upon the
sensitivity of the decision makers to both ecological and
development factors. Blanket denials o,f permits because
of a strict construction of the legislative purpose, with
disregard for the possibility of reasonable conditions,
will only cause the courts to invalidate such aations as
-2)-
unreasonable restrictions on the use of property, thus
preventing what was meant to be achieved - the preservation
or wetlands.
As it is clear that either the issuance or denial
of a permit can have important consequences for the
owner of the land involved, it is proper to require
that prospective buyers and other interested persons
should be put on notice of the administrative decision.
Yet only Maine requires the registration of such orders. 79
Massachusetts and New Hampshire require that a copy
of a permit be posted on the land,80 but that provision
is presumably to aid only law enforcement officers.
Maine has another unique provision that is highly
desirable and should be imitated. The statute specifies
that all permits expire after three years. 81 In most
cases of dredging or filling the work will be done within
three years, but if any project is delayed it would be,
wise to take another look at it in light of changed
conditions, both locally and regionally. ~he premises
on which the original decision was made may no longer
be sound. If the project is a long term one and at the
end of three years a large investment has been made in
it, however, it will probably not be in the public
interest to stop it.
"'24-
6. Enforcement
Every state has a fine for violations of the basic
sta~ute prohibiting dumping or filling, with ~~ssaohusetts,
New Hampshire and Rhode Island allowing imprisonment
82'
as well. Connecticut and Mass~chuset~s provide that
every day a violation continues shall be a separate
offense, with the result tha~ the fines can be made
prohibitive. Even more effe~tive than a fine, insofar
as the wetlandS are concerned, is relief ordering their-
restoration, to the extent possible, to their condition
before the violat ion. Connect iout, l\oIaine and Rhode
83Island have provisions for such orders.
Only Connecticut and Rhode Island have put explicit
statements in their statutes that a permit may be suspe~ded
or revoked by the administrative agency if its conditions
are violated. 84 Connecticut goes one step further and
allows the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental
Prate'ctian at his discretion to require an applicant
to post a bond to secure the carrying out of whatever
conditions have been imposed. While probably ,seldom
needed., such authority could be valuable in the case
of recalcitrant developers. All the states, with the
exception ,of Rhode Island, also specifically give their
courts the power to restrain violators before the appeal
of the order itself can be decided. aS
-25-
Massachusetts and New Hampshire have set up
environmental protection divisions within the offices of
. 86thelr attorney generals., Massachusetts also states that
any "natural resources officer" or other officers "having
police powers" may en:forc·e its statute. 87 New Hampshire
provides for any law enforcement officer to report any
violations to the Water Resources Board. 88 Maine specifies
that its statute may be enforced by the Commissioner of
Marine Resources,89 while Rhode Island gives the same
authority to a division of enforcement within the Department
of Natural Resources. 90 Giving enforcement powers
to any law enforcement officer, combined with the require-
ment for a posting of any permit on the land,9l would
s'eem to give the bes't chance of having violations brought
to the attention of the proper authorities, bolstering
the efforts of conservation groups and other concerned
citizens in watching for violation.s. Having enough
enforcement officers to check on all the permits granted
as, well as generally o,bserving activities along the
coast would appear to be somewhat of a problem.
7. Appeals and Relief
The appeal procedures of the various states are
generally similar. In Massachusetts, where the original
decision is left· to the municipality>, the Department
-26-
of Natural Resources has first reviewing authority if an
order has been issued. 92 It has authority to make the
initial determination if no hearing has been held within
the 2.1 day period from the submission of an application or
no decision has been made within 21 days of a hearing.
T'he Commissioner, any person aggrieved by the order or the
lack of an order, any abutting owner, or any 10 municipal
residents may, within 10 days of the issuing of the order
or the failure to make an order, request the Department
"to determine [among other things3 Whether the area on
whioh the proposed w~rk is to be done is significant to
protection of land containing shellfish or to the protection
of fisheries. " The Department has 70 days within which
to respond, and no work may be done on the project until
10 days after its order, which supercedes the local
conservation commission's, has been issued.
Maine can be said to have a form of discretionary,
non~statutory. administrative appeal. 9J If the Board
of Environmental Protection feels that the application
or the municipality's decision has created sufficient
pUblic concern .. it wi~l have a full"'dress public hearing,
which gives parties a chance to present their views
to the Board directly.
connecticut gives the right to an administrative
appeal under its Administrative Procedure Act. 94 New
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Hampshire also allows a participant in the proceedings
befor.e the Water Resources Board to petition for .a
rehearing wit.hin 2.0 days of its ord,er. The granting
of a r,ehearing is discretionary. but no j'udicial appeal
may be taken unless a rehearing has been requested. The
Board mus't decide within 10 days whether to grant or deny
the petition or to suspend its order for further consideration. 95
In Connecticut. Maine and New Hampshire, the applicant
is given the specific right to appeal to the appropriate
court for rell ef from the r,estricti ve order or denial
of a permit. 96 In addition, any other person. including
an "interested community group," aggrieved by an ord·er
may appeal in Connecticut, While in New Hampshire the
right is restricted to "a party to or participating in
the action or proceedings before the Board." In Maine
the imp~ication of the statute is that only an applicant
may appeal,97 but the wording is ambiguous. In Massachusetts
and Rhode Island there are no speci~ic, statutory provisions
relating to appeals in wetlands cases, but applicants and
others would have a right to appeal under administrative
procedures acts. 98
The statutory grounds for relief are generally
couched in t,erms of an unreasonable or unjust: use of
the police power, equivalent to a taking without compen-
sation. 99 If the court finds that there has been
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a taking, Connecticut and New Hampshire specifically
give the administrative body two optionsl either reverse
the original order or amend any conditions; or allow
the court to assess damages in accordance with the state's
normal compensation pr,ocedures .100 In the other s,tates
the relief would be much the ,same in practice.
D. Administratiye Orders
Maine and Massachusetts have nearly equivalent
legislation giving the relevant state agency authority
to issue general orders regulating dredging, filling;
or otherwise altering or polluting any wetlandS area. IOl
The definitions of wetlands and the legislative purposes
of these statutes parallel thQ~e outlined in the individual
permit statutes. By having the authority to issue general
orders the two states are given a chance to anticipate
the destruction of wetlands and prohibit damaging projects
before they are initiated by private owners. But, un-
fortunately, only Massachusetts' has used this valuable
statutory authority.
The Massachusetts legislation has been very successful
in allowing the state to put protective o~ders on a large
part of the state's wetlands. By June 30, 1971, 30% of
the state's roughly 60,000 acres of wetlands Were pro~
tected, while orders covering another 42% were being
processed. The Department of Natural Resources, acting with
102the approval of the Board of Natural Resources, makes
a careful study ,of each area, deeiding which land it wants
to protect after consulting with local conservation
commissions. Preliminary discussions are held with owners
and municipal officials before a public hearing is held.
Every owner affected by the proposed ,order is given a
chance to talk with a state official about the proposed
order, although only about 5% do. The Department negotiates
with any who protest and apparently has had to make few
important, concessions of leaving property outside the
coverage of the order. Even if an owner"s property is left
outside tne protected area, he would stil~ have to obtain
a permit to develop his land, and that requirement dis~
courages many. Although the Department has money to buy
easements or the fee outright, little haa been needed.
Many own,ers have been happy to cooperate, knowing that the
land around them will be protected as wel~. The final
orders are recorded in the appropriate registry of deeds.
These orders consist of defining certain activities
that may occur without regulation, otner activities
that may occur under certain oonditions and others tha~
require a epecial permit. They in effect' ac't as
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conservation easements. Any appeal of an Qrder must be
taken within 90 days of the o'wner reoeiving notice of
the order, and such petitions are the exclusive way of
determining the validity of such orders. The court is to
hold the order inapplicable to only the petitioner's land
if it finds that "such order so restricts the use of the
[petitioner's] property as to deprive him of the practical
uses thereof and is therefore an unreasonable exercise of
the police power because the order constitutes an equivalent
of a taking without compensation." The Department may
then "take the fee or any les,sel' interest ••. by eminent
domain." In fact, there has been no sustained litigation,
and the result is that in a relatively short time the
Department knows whether it has effective protection. lO ]
Rhode Island's Coastal Resources Management Council
is authorized to implement regulations concerning "the
resources of the state's coastal region."l04 Any proposed
development is to be tested against these standards in
order to see whether it would conflict with them 01'
'isignificantly damage the environment of the coastal
region." "Intertidal salt marshes" are specifically in-
cluded as being areas "in which there is a reasonable
probability of conflict with a plan or program for resources
management or damage to the coastal environment ...105 The
extent to Which this authority has been used is not known
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at the present time.
Both the Ma$sachusetts and Rhode Island schemes
are more in the nature of planning mechanisms than
individual permit statutes. This direction is the one
that state efforts will proba'bly take in the future' be-
cause of both federal encQuragement under the Coastal
Zone Management Act.106 and the realiz.ation that to preserve
one part of the coastal zone while ignoring the rest is
not very fruitful. The Massachusetts success is encouraging,
and the other states should certainly think hard about
following its lead. The scheme requires time and expertise',
but it may well ~ead to a greatly diminished use of the
107individual permit procedure. In any case it wauld
probably be much more difficult to obtain a variance from
the us,es allowed in the order than to obtain .8 permit under
the other statutory scheme because the public interest
in the land has already been established after a public
hearing and the owner has at least acquiesced in that
decision.
-)2-
III. JUDICIAL REJOINDERS - POLICE POWER
REGULATION OR COMFENSABLE TAKINGS?
A. The Pr·esent Status
The testing of the New England wetlands legislation
in the courts has as yet been only fragmentary. The
courts have generally acknowledged the broad right
of legislatures to set up regulatory schemes in this
area of environmental protectionl08 and have found them
to be constitutional ~n their detail. 109 The chief
issue has been whether a property owner denied a permit
t·o dredge or fill his wetland can successfully challenge
the administrative agency's decision on the ground
that it results in an unconstitutional taking of property.110
Although at first glance, and in the view of many commen-
tators,lll it seems that the judicial results have
been less than happy from the perspective of wetlands
preservation, the present state of affairs is by no
means so discouraging.
The issue of when regulation of property is a
legitimate utilization of a state"s broad police power
or a constitutionally impermissable taking unless the
owner is compensated is an old one and has been the
b . t f hI' t . t . 112 It' tSU Jec 0 mue· 1 19a 10n. - c 1S unnecessary 0
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review that history here. II ) It is sufficient to say
that there is no clear resolution of the issue and that
courts and commentators continue to search for one. The
growing realization of the need to protect the environment
and the resu~ting increase in the statutory regulation of
property for environmental purposes has given a new focus
to the issue and has led to calls for the evolution of
new attitudes towards governmental regulation of private
property.
Of the various doctrines, used in the past to
tell Whether a regulation resulted in a taking, the
diminution of value theoryl14 seems to have the most contem-
porary vigor. 115 In State y. JOhnson,116 the first state
case to rule ,on a wetlands statute, and seen by so many
as a disaster for the successful preservation of the
environment, lI7 the Maine Supreme Court held that the
denial of a permit without compensation was unconstitutional.
To prohibit the Johnsons from filling their land for a
housing project depri vea them of the, profitable use of
their land and so reduced its value a~ to constitute a
taking. In Dooley v, TQ!n Plan and _Zonin~ Qommission,llB
cited in JOhnson,l19 and in Bartlett v. Zoning Commission,120
the Connecticut Supreme Court held that local zoning
ordinances worked such a diminution in the value of the
property involved that compensation was required.
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In Massachusetts, ,QQwn,i.ssipDer oi.Natyral Resourge.s
v. S. Yaple & Co., 121 also cited in Johnson as suppolrt.ing
that decision,122 involved a permit granted by the state
. 12'J
under the predecessor of the present statute. . It
allowed the owner to dredge part of Broad Marsh in Wareham
for a marina but not to fill any of it for housing. Al-
though the trial court had found that the denial was not
a taking of property, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded
the case for a determination of what other uses of the
property were available to the owner. Thus, ra~her than
supporting the JOhnSQn decisiQn, Volpe left the p~lice
power regulation versus the taking question open. The
Massachusetts court did go to some lengths to focus on
determining the diminution in value Qf the property by the
wetlands restriction by listing a series of questions it
wished answered. 124 Unfortunately, on remand, the case
came before a trial jUdge apparently unsympathetic to the
sta~e's position, and the prohibition against filling was
dropped. 125 These cases clearly outline the wetlands
problem I to preserve them requires the prohibition of
dredging or filling, but to do SQ is generally seen as
making the land virtually worthless, thus requiring the
owner to be compensated. Even if the great economic value
of a wetland to society is granted, how, in all fairness,
the argument runs,126 ean the individual owner be made to
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pay the price f.or its preservation? There are a number of
answers to that crucial question that are emerging, and
they will be discussed later in this paper.
More recent cases offer greater hope that the
courts will not characteri2e the denial of dredge or
fill permits as takings. T'he Massachusetts co-urt, in
Turnpike Realty ~Q. y, Dedham,IZ7 a case analogous to
Volpe, held a zoning ordinance; severely restricting
the use of property inc.luded in a flood plain district,
not to be a taking. The similarities of Dedham to the
wetlands situation are encouraging. The purposes for the
restriction found by the court included the protection of
neighboring property owners from flood damage and of the
public :from. expenditures for flood relief, 128 purposes
at least implicit in the wetlands legislation. Citing
Vartelas y. Water Re§oyr~s CDmmission,129 a Connecticut
case upholding the establishment of stream channel en-
croachment lines, the Massachusetts court characterized
the restriction in Dedham as preventing harm to the public
interest rather than taking property for the' public welfare.
It therefore found that no compensation was Dequired. 1JO
Certainly prohibiting t'he dredging or filling of a wetland
lik~wise prevents harm to t,he public interest caused! by
the destruction of valuable nutrients for marine and
animal life as well as by flooding. The prohibiting is
not for the purpose of taking the wetlanqs and doing something
with them for the public welfare not now being done.
The Dedham court did not, however, address directly
the diminution in valUe aspect found so important in the
Johnson, Dooley, and Bartlett cases. The Turnpike Realty
Company argued that the zoning restriction caused an 88%
reduction in value, a figure challenged by the municipality,
but the trial court made no specific finding on the matter.
In its opinion the Supreme JUdicial Court cited Dooley
as being contra, but did not discuss it further and did
not mention either Bartlett or Johnson.l)l So the
diminution in value issue remains problematic.
Another aspect of the case is troubling as well.
As tl').e Chief Justice- pointed out in his concurranc·e, no
spe'cific permit applicati.on had yet been made, and
he said that the issue o~ cQmpensation should be decided
when it was clear exactly what depri,vation Turnpike Realty
had suffered by being included in the flood plain district. l32
If an application had been denied, the deprivation of a
wetlands owner would be clearly focused, and it would be
easier for a court to come down on the other side of the
illusive lLne dividing a "free" police power regulation
from a costly taking.
In Brecciaroli v. Commissioner of Environmental
Prot_ection,133 the Connecticut Supreme Court recently'
decided its first case dealing with tbe. state I s basic
wetlands preservation statute. The court upheld the
denial o,f a permit to fill 5. J acres of land within a
designated wetlands area. Again Doo~e¥ and Bartlett
were cited, but the, court declared them to be "not
controlling under the facts of this case. There has
been no 'practical confis'cation' of the plaintiff's land."
The court admitted that the "wetland would have gr,eater
value to him [the owner] if it were filledJ" but strong
statutory statements of the public interest in prohibiting
the filling of wetlands and in the environment in general
apparently helped to tip the scales in favor of not re-
quiring compensation. 1J4 Quoting Corsino x, Grover,135
the court said that "'the welfare of the public, rather than
private gain, is a paramount consideration •. I "lJ6
Building on a dictum in the earlier Vartelas case,
which had stated that even when a specific permit ap-
plication had been denied, the question of "[w]hether
the plaintiff could build another type of structure - for
example one on piers or cantilevers" had not been pas'sed
on,137 the ]recciaroli court concluded that the permit
denial did not exhaust the owner's uses [or his land.
It stressed tha.t ,,[ t ]h.e deniaL •. merely prohibited one
spe'cifie use •..• [ the owner] may still be permitted on
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subsequent application to fill a lesser portion ••• to
conduct other regulat,ed activities on t)le wetland!" .[or to]
make any reasonable unregulated use of his land •..• "1)8
In a sense the result was better than that in Dedham; in
Brecciaroli the owner had applied for a specific permit and
had still been turned down. But the fact remains that the
De'partmen.t might well not grant a permit for a smaller fill ...
ing, and the court seemed to invite the owner to challenge
another permit denial.
There is some comfort, however, in that the court
recognized "the importance of wetlands as natural resources"
and the threat of "their imminent demise at the hands of
man. ulJ9 The Johnson and Volpe courts had also acknowledged
the impo~tance of wetlands ,140 and that fact is crucial.
For the key to success in upholding the purpose of the
wetlands legislation is to make the connection between the
specific denial of a permit and the important pUblic pur-
pose to be served thereby as tight as possible. The courts
are moving away from a seemingly automatic use of the
diminuti.on in value theory to one involving a more delicate
balancing between individual loss on ,one hand and pUblic
logs on the other. 141 The latest Supreme Court case
on the issue, Goldbl~t;t 'Y. Hempstead,142 cited by
Brecciaroli for this proposition,14) stated that "while
a comparison of values before and after [restrictions]
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. 144is relevant ... it is by no me~ns conclus1ve.
B.•, Alternatiye Solutions
Before examining how to meet· the taking iss.ue
head on, in the caSe of wetlands, we might pause briefly
to analyze the possible alternatives. One obvious solution
to the problem of preserving wetlands is for the states
to compensate private owners whe·n the courts require it.
But, 'the practical inadequacy of thi's solution is equally
apparent. While the New England states have statutory
programs for the acquisition of rights in wetlands,145 and
some are using them, the funds available are inadequate.
Undeveloped land is not generally bought by eminent domain
at a price commensurate with its natural state but rather
at one reflecting its reasonable, developed potential. 146
The cost, then, is very high, and states generally have been
reluctant to appropriate funds on the scale necessary to
preser~e significant amounts of their dwindling supply
of wetlands. 14?
A middle course that would be less expensive would
be to increase the use of conservation easements. Most
of the states have statutes providing for the purchase
of such easements by state or local governments. 148
Such easements may be tailored to fit the specific
-40-
circumstances. restric,ting only the uses harmful to the
particular environment involved. The Massachusetts
protective orders149 have the same effect of only partially
restricting the use of land. The combination of flexibil~ty
and a lower cost may make easements a more promising
150alternative than outright purchase, but, despite some
success, neither course, wh~ther used alone or together.
is, li'kely to answer the entire problem of wetlands pre-
servation. A relatively costless system of regulati'on that
will cover even reluctant owners is s,till needed.
Another, easier alternative is to do nothing'i
If the legislative schemes presently on the books are
run efficiently and enforced effectively, they may achieve
considerable success. Despite the "disastrous" Johnson
~ecision, the Maine Board of Environmental Protection has
,continued to deny permits to those seeking to fill wetlands .151
While its figures show a denial rate of only 12 to 14% of
all applications for wetlands permits. 152 they mask the
real workings of the administrative system. A large number
of applications are submitted several times, and by
negotiation many are changed sufficiently to meet the Board's
'firmly held poliey of allowing no filling unless there is
both no other feasible alternative and the project is seen
as vital to the state .153 But while there have 'been no
persistent legal challenges to these denial's, that situation
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is not likely to, las't. Givan the Johnson decision, there
is oound to be a Maine developer willing to fight for
his permit in the courts. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that the same results will occur in the other
states should adverse decisions be handed down. So
the compensation issue ~ust be met directly if there is
to be effective and widespread preservati,on of wetlands.
c. Arguments-Jpr" Police Power Regulation
There are several ways in which the case for
characterizing wetlands preservation as a police power
regulation can be strenghtened. And it needs to be
strengthened, not just for the environmental cause, but
for satisfactory judicial results. For although the courts
have held that no taking has occurred in several c'ases,
their reasons for doing so have often been ambiguous and
conclusionary. Such decisions satisfy no one, neither the
losing 'property owner, the stat,e agencies charged with
preserving wetlands, nor the cause of reasoned just ice., It
is by' no means clear that the cases. as they stand, are
always fair to the property owner. If society is now
determined to make up for it~ past failings in guarding the
natural environment, why should he, and not society in
general, oear the' economic burden? The response is that
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property owners in many cases are not justified in their
claims for compensation because they are not losing as
much as they may think and they do not have the freedom
of us'e that they assert.
1. Alternative uses of wetlandS
Clearly the case for preserving wetlands would
be strengthened by citing alternative economic uses for
wetlands. For the cour~s, even where they have upheld
permit denials, have never said that a complete diminution
in value escapes being a taking. At best the courts have
helped the state's counsel along by saying that it is not
yet clear that no alternative use can be found. One does
not get the impression that respondents have helped themselves
very often by giving the courts examples of other uses. l54
In fact, there is a limited market for open land, per ~,
as, increasing numbers of people leave overcrowded urban
environments for What remains of the country. Scientists
or school administrat,ors may pay some'thing for the use of
such land as a natural laboratory.15S Clearly the
possibilities of aquaculture have only ,just begun to be
explored. As our understanding of the role of wetlands in
the prevention of siltlng increases, government agencies
such as the Army Corps of Engineers may fLnd it economic
to buy easements to wetlands near frequently dredged
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estuaries. Wetlands can certainly 'be used for ut ility lines
a.s, individual pilings do relatively little damage. Indeed,
it may not be impossibl·e to 'build structures o'n unobtrusive
piers. The limited use of the water by boats, without
dredging, is also not harmful.
Some of these uses may produce little economic
return, but present doctrine, s'eems to require a,t least
something. Furthermore, just a~ one commentator has said
that the many. new land use restrictions imposed by various
levels of government may add up to a virtual loss of all
use,l56 so we must also count on the other side the full
range of possible, profitable uses of that restricted land,
so that the full costs and benefits of environmental
legislation may be weighed. As one practitioner has observed,
the struggle to preserve wetlands calls for yet another use
of the Brandeis brief With its non-legal evidentiary
authorities. 157
2. Th.e Nu~unce Argument
Another, more complex line of argument that Ynay
have value for bolstering the preservation cause is that
centered around what might be called a private nuisance
theory. As Professor sax argues, the uses made of individual
pieces of prope~ty affect the neighboring property, and
it is unr~asonable to loak at the diminution in value of
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one piece without considering its effect on the other. A
restriction placed on one piece of land may improve another a
the absence of a restriction may harm another. The law
has long allowed a plaintiff to seek the prohibition of a
particular use of his neighbor·s land if he suffers ,special
injury because of that use. But in much compensation
litigation, the courts have only looked at the effect on
the party protesting regulation, without evaluating the
"ripple" effect on other owners of allowing certain uses
to go unchecked. l58 Obviously wetlands are an example of
how the use of one piece of property extends to another.
The destruction of one part of a productive wetland may
destroy another because of the changes made in any of the
many delicate balances that go into making a wetland. 159
But one problem with the use of this argument
in the case of wetlands is that it is the cumulative
effect of the destruction of wetlands that is most
measur.able. It is extremely difficult to pin down what
the loss to others is because of the destruction of one
area of wetlands. The state in the Johnson case clearly
had difficulty with this argument and really had to concede
that it was not particularly concerned with the filling of
the Johnson's property but with the loss of the Whole
marsh. 160 But as our knowledge of how wetlands function
increases, and we have a better understanding of the
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interrelation of one part of a wetland to another and how
much each area of wetland can produce, we may reach a point
when we can measure more precisely the loss stemming from
the destruction of only portions of a wetland. Then the
private nuisance argument may well be useful.
Another problem with the private nuisance argument
i~ that it should be used only in situations where commonly
accepted rights of property ownership have been, violated.
Compensation should be required where the law may have
suddenly created some new duty.16l The Dooley caseL62
was an instance where this argument, only implicitly
allud,ed to, probably had gr"eat force. There a flood plains
zoning restriction was challenged and the fact that the
owner had already been assessed over $lltOOO for a sewer
system, giving him the expectation of being allowed to
develop his property, may have given the court the equity
argument it needed to overturn What it recognized as the
good, public purposes 0f the rezoning. 16J The Johnson
164case was another e'xample of What were seen to 'be the
owner's legitimate expectations being frustrated by' new
regulations. Part of the Johnsons! property had aLready
been filled in and houses built and sold. Another area of
the affected wetlands, across from the Johnsons' property,
had previously been filled in. 165 Naturally the court
was sympathetic to their claim of unfairness.
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But the notion that property owners should have
a legally protected right to, the, fully developed value
of their property should be rejectea. They do not have
a right to be compensated for a speculative return on their
investment that they, thems,elveS, might never achieve .166
As one commentator noted in relation to the Johnson, case j
while a court may say that an owner is being deprived of
the value of his land as bui~ding sites, th~ court is
certainly in no position to say that the housing market,
When the houses are finished, will provide the owner with
his expected P~Ofits.167 Any development has a host of
pos sible risks attached to it. That· a governmen't agenQY
may put certain restrictions in its, way is but one of th.em.
For a court to hold that an owner may be compensated
at the level of his expectations also ignores the fact
that property uses, and thus values, are all interrelated.
If the Jonnsons should build their second group of houses,
the value of the houses already built, which may have
sold at a premium because of the proximity of open land,
may well be reduced. Thus, the neighboring owners suffer
deprivation because of an activity thought not to be in the
public interest, ~., the filling of a wetland. Courts
should recognize that what one owner proposes to do is
seldom an isolated event, with no economic ramifications
on others. They should be willing to hold, in the words
of one' writer, that "the public autherity in denying the
fill permit took no existing use rights of the landowner.
but instead merely decided not to participate in the effort
to create new ones. It For the need for a permit from the
state is as crucial to the proposed development as the
filling itself. 168 As a recent First Circuit opinion
observed, "all changes in the law dash expectations when
t'hey make t omorI' oW t s rules different fr om yest erday , s • ,,169
With the use of the public trust argument ,out-lined below,
one can, maKe a good case that the wetlands regulations are
neither unreasonable nor unexpected restrictions on the
legitimate uses of property.170
One criticism of the nuisance theory - tnat in
many cases causation of the harm cannot be fairly laid at
the owner's feet l ?l- does not apply to the wetlands case.
In othet situations the critieism may be valid. Natural
occurances may cause the narm,172 o~ development may over-
take a '0nce reasonable use of property.I?J Newly perceived
social virtues may require new restrictions,l74 or an
otherwise harmless activity may be seen as indirectly aiding
an undesirable one. 175 It may be that to deny compensation
in such cases is unfair. But with wetlands, it is clear
that it is the owner who is creating the harm. Whenever
produ'ctive wetlands have been f.illed they ha,ve harmed the
e~vironmentf and despite its ~equent abuse, there has long
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been some realization that the environment must be protected
for the interests of us all. l76
.3. The Public Trust _Argument l ??
Jus't as the destruction of one piece of a wetland
may harm another piece belonging to a neighboring upland
owner, so it will harm the seaward owner, the state, and
the land and waters that 'the state holds in trust for the
public. Simply stated, the argument has two parts. First,
the alteration of a wetland may involve the use of pUblic
property by directly appropriating water over which "the
federal government exercises paramount control" because of
its navigability, or land that may belong to the state be-
cause of its ownership of the seabed below high or low
water, depending on the applicable law. 178 Second, the
alteration of a wetland may impinge upon public rights in-
directly by adversely affecting neighboring public property,
Each government involved owns its property in trust £or
the public, and while littoral, or upland, owners ~y have
c,ertain privileges in connection with that property because
it borders their own, they do not have the right to do with
it as they p~ease.179 Thus, in denying a permit for an
acti.vity that would harm the pUblic interest - here, the
public interest in the preservation of wetlands, clearly
expressed by the respective legislatures - the state
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agency is protectLng the property rights of the public.
There is no taking of priv:ate pro'perty but rather the
prevention of the taking of pUblic property.
The strength of the public trust argument with
r,egard to wetlandS preservation will vary depending upon
which part of 'the wetland is involved and in Which state
it is located. F,ar "the otherwise convenient geographical
region of New England has two distinct, land ownership
doctrines for tidal property. In Maine and Massachusetts,
where the 1641-47 Colonial Ordinancel80 governs, private
owners have rights to the mean low wa~er mark, Whereas in
Connecticut, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, the line is the
more common one of mean high water. 181 Since the productive
areas of wetlands range from below low water to at least
one foot above high water,l82 the public trust argument may
be useful in some areas of the wetland and not others.
The nature of the public trust over the foreShore 183
held by the state is nowhere precisely laid out. It stemmed
originally from the Roman law and underwent many tl'ansforma-
tions in Anglo-American law during the period from Magna
Carta to, the present. lts evolution continues today as
the pUblic interest changes. While English law resisted
any expansion of the rights of the pUblic in free navigation
in tidal waters y that in the United States recogni~ed
pUblic rights in fishing, camping, hunting and recreation.
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The definition of navigable waters was expanded from in-
eluding only tidal waters to one including those navigable-
. f t 184In- ac •
Connectieut's law s~ates that the state owns both
the foreshore and the soil under navigable waters in
trust for public us,e, and that the public has: certain
rights in all navigable waters. Tidal waters are presumed
navigable, but the question is one of fact. The navigable
use "must be, for useful gain and occupation." The extent
of the pUblic interest in the foreshore, se~bed and navigable
waters includes navigation. recreation, and the "commercial
and consumer use- of sea produce." The upland owner has
rights in the ,foreshore that can be separately conveyed
from his upland title, but he does not have actual ownership
of the foreshore. His rights in it consist of the right of
access from the sea, the right to "wharf out" and the right
of ownership o£ reclaimed land or natural accretions. 185
But 'those rights are SUbject to state control.
As one commentator writes. "To the extent that state
activity and regulation is necessary to secure the benefits
of public waters for the well-being of the pUblic, the
. d' . d l· . . h't· b . t d' f . - ••186
'In' 3. V3. ua rlparlan rlg 3.S SU, servl-,en an 3.n er1,oc'.
Thus, in Shorehaven Golt Club. Inc. y, Water Resources
commission,187 SZ,estowicki y. Water Resources Commission, 188
ang Rvkar Industrial Corp. Va Gill, 189 the Connecticut
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courts have upheld denials of permits to dredge a channel,
extend a pier and fill a wetland, respectively, on the
ground that a private interest was properly subordinated to
the public interest. In Rykar the court clearly recognized
the importance of the wetland and found the public's
interest in it of more importance than the owner's interest
in being able to have access to the sea by the cheapest
means possible, in this case by filling the wetland. 190
In Shorehaven the court likewise said that it was possible that
less disruptive alternatives than dredging existed.1.91
T'hus, the pUblic trust argument has bite in Connecticut,
even the extreme cas,eof denying an upland owner what, might
seem to be his strongest privilege in public land - eaSY
access to the sea.
In New Hampshire, too, the courts have acknowledged
that t,idal waters belong to the public and that wetlands
are thus SUbject to state regulation in the pUblic interest.
In Sibson-Y', State the court said that "the rights of
littoral owners on public waters are always subject to the
paramount right of the State to control them reasonably in
the interests of navigation, fishing and other public
purposes ...192
The Rykar case raised the important question of
the validity of regulation of the one foot of land above
the high water mark allowed by the wetlands statute. 19J
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The court found the record unclear as to what land was
involved in the proposed project and wisely avoided. the
issue by re'asoning that the appellant would" in any case,
have to submit a revised application and that the issue could
be resolved at that later time. 194 In arguing that such
regulation is valid, even in states where private ownership
extend.s to the low water mark. it could be pointed out tha,t
the water in the wetland between the areas of upland is
navigable and thus subject to the public trust doctrine. By
definition the water is tidal, and thus presumptively
navigable. In many cases it may be used by fishermen in
pursuit of their public right of fishing, or by other upland
owners, who wish to see it preserved, as a meanS of access
to their land, thus making it navigable-in-fact. The
federal .gov·ernment will thus have rights over the wate·r,
and the state will own the so,11 beneath. In those states
owning ·to the high water mark, the state owns more of the
land threatened by the filling or dredging. By filling the
wetland the private owner will in effect be expropriating
pUbl i cproperty • In that cas,e it is the government that
should be compensated, not the private owner.
The 1641-47 Colonial Ordinance195 may reduce
the force o,f the publi.o trust argument in rl"l8.ine and
Massachusetts i~sofar as a direct injury to the state
is asserted.196 Much less of any wetland wi.ll actually
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be public property. The private II propriety" .granted,
however, was not absolute. The same pUblic rights of access,
navigation and fishing that are found in the high water
mark sta~es were specifically reserved by the Ordinance. 197
For instance, the Maine Supreme Court has long recognized the
importance of estuaries to the valuable fishing trade. In
1881 it held that the upland owner holds the foreshore •.•
subject to certain reserved rights of the
public. Navigation must not be obstructed,
nor the pa8sag'e, of fish into bays, creeks,
or up the course of navigable rivers, with-
out legislative authority. These are matters
of common right, and such an obstruction of
them, even by the holder of the fee in the
h . bl" " 198sea 8 ore, 18 a pU 10 nUlsance,
It went on t08aya "It is true, in the present in-
stance, that the jus publicum may be of trifling value.
But the principle is an important one, protecting the
openness of navigable waters, and must be observec:t.,,199
In the same vein the Massachusetts court in Henry v.'
NewburYRort stated that the "Legislature could, for the
protection of the rights of the public in navigation, or
for the security of the coast [from storm damage], regulate
the use of the territory between high-water and lowwater
k ,,200mar , ...
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The New England legislatures have regula:ted w'etlands
t,he purpose of protecting the public interest in navigation,
fishing' and coastal protection. 201 Wetlands serve the
same function as rivers in the spawning of marine life, and
their loss would mean the loss. of the sustenance and habitat
of many creatures. Just as the Col,onial Ordinance was
passed to foster water commerce by expanding the right to
build wharves, so wetlands l~gislation was passed, in part,
to help prevent flood control. Thus" it could be said!
that a private owner of wetlands holdS the foreshore
sUbject to a public tru~t of maintaining them in th~ir
natural, productive condition. It is a trust that has
been in existence for over three nundred years, but one
recognized to be increasingly important in this century.
If the private owner fills in his land he directly violates
that trust, just as he violates state ownership rights in
the case of states using the high water mark.
The second part of the public trust argument,
that public rights may be indirectly affected by the
destruction of a wetland, applies to all the states,
regardless of Where the line of private ownership ends.
It asserts that wetlands perform a unique and valuable
service and that their destruction would be an intolerable
deprivation of public rights to the produce of the sea.
For wetla.nds are valuable fax- beyond their immediat,e environs.
For instance I only Some 55% of the average 10 tons of
organic matter producea by a wetland per acre, per year, is
used in the we~land itself. The rest, broken down in the
marsh in~o usable food, is washed away into the estuaries
and coastal waters to be used by a wide variety of fish and
shell fish. 202 Thus, no matter where actual state ownership
begins, the state's resources are affected by whether the
wetlands are preServed.
As we have seen, to survive, wetlands should
be le'ft alone as much as possible. 20 3 The Council on
l1'nvironmental Quality, which has described wetlands as
"critical natural features," state'd in its FOur~h Annual
Reports
The emphasis on the functions that certain
critical lands serve in their natural state
simply explains why a court's determination
that a par~mount public interest limits the
'right' to alter the land's features does
not overturn legitimate prior expectations
of property owners. 204
This concept of the importance to the public of keeping
a unique resource, in this case wetlands r in its natural
state found strong expression in the Just v. Marinette
t .. - 205Coun y 0pJ.n~on.
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It upheld the denial of a fill application
under a county, inland shoreland zoning ordinance, saying;
An owner of land has no absolute and un-
limited right to change the essential natural
character o,f his land s,o as' t'o USe it for a
purpose fo·r which it was unsuited in it·s
natural state and which injures the rights
206
of others.
It distinguished the Doolev207 and JOhnson208 cases by
saying that those courts had assumed "that an owner has a
right to use his property in any way and for any purpose
he sees fit.,· 20 9 The~ court strongly rejected that
notion.
The state's case in Just was helped by the fact
that Wisconsin's public trust doctrine is particularl~
clear. The owner, therefore, could be held to have know-
1 d f h · d t t t h th bl" t t 210_e ge 0 1.5 _U Y no 0' arm' e pu 1.C In-eres •
But it can be argued that the New England wetlands statutes
and the other legislation concerned with the environment
in general have also .made clear that private property
rights are, in appropriate cases, subject to regulation
by the state. The ancient public interest in navigation
and fis'hing, under which the foreshore has long been
subject to regulation, now encompasses wetlands. We now
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realize theiI direct relationship to the prevention of
flooding and silting and the maintenance of a successful
fishing industry. As a Council on Environmental Quality
report put itl
To require an owner ~o assume the risk of
changing notions of property in the case of
land that exhibits on its face its pUblicly
critical nature is a significantly lesser
imposition than the risk assumed, for example,
by the brewery owners in Mugler v. Kansas
concerning possible changing pUblic attitudes
toward alcoholic beverages. 2l1
In the case of wetlands we are dealing with property that
not only has a clear, public purpose, but also has been
regulated in a variety of other ways in the past for the,
very same purposes. Because of its proximity to and effect
on the public trust areas, the foreshore, and thus large
parts of we~lands, too, have already been subject to
certain public servitudes, whether or not the fee has been
in priva~e or public hands.
It is true that the form of regulation - preservation
,of the natural state - has taken a new form in the wetlands
case and that it goes against the old notion of the p~blic
need for "improved" land. But today, in many ar,eas other
-58-
than wetlandS, we know that the public is not always best
served by changing the nature of land, and property uses
h b 1 t d d " 1 212 W k th t . ~ave· e·en regu'a e accor ~ngy.e now a ,In mos"
cases wetlands are far more valuable to society as a whole
as wetlands than as more house lots or factory sites. 213
But we also know that to destroy wetlands is also to destroy
indirectly resources that the state holdS for us all, and it
is that fact that is the basic justification in the public
trust argument for regulation without compensation.
We are late in realizing the need t~ preserve
portions of our heritage of open land. In so many areaS
of our environment we now see that we cannot continually
remake the landscape into something "better. II Our very
existence ultimately depends upon the maintenance of a
balance in nature - a balance that provides us with fresh
air, clean water and a varied and healthful supply of food.
Wetlands are but one part of this great natural jigsaw
puzzle of complex interrelationships. But they have been
specifically singled out by statute for preservation.
Just as over ~hree hundred years ago the Colonial Ordinance
sought to encourage commerce by altering traditional land
ownership patterns, 214 so now the wet~and·s legislation seeks
to make the old concept of the public trust in the sea and
foreshore' meaningful in terms of today I s needs. The New
England courts have shown a Willingness to accept this
basic premise. It is the task of counsel now to continue
to use the fruits of scientific research to demonstrate
in increasing detail the relationship betw'een the preserva-
tion of specific wetlands and the preservation ,of the
property rights of neighboring owners, including t~e 6~ate,
and the rights of us' all in the many benefits that wetlands
give us.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The legislative findings in the New England wet-
lands legislation make clear the need for the preservation
of these valuable, natural resources'. The statutes set up
administrative systems in each state to issue conditional
permits in an attempt to regulate activities harmful to the
wetlands. What can we conclude about these systems? While
each varies in its details, each system does focus the day-
to-day atten~ion of at least part of an executive department
in each state on the problems of wetlands. That there
is a problem - a need for prese~vation - is at least
officially recognized, thus increasing the chances of not
having wetlands disappear altogether under the earth-moving
equipment of the developers.
On the administrative level mare staffing for
planning and enforcement is needed, however, if the full
potential of the legislation is to be reached. As with
any relatively new regulatory scheme, there is a need for
the continuing education of the affected public. Com-
prehensive enforcement can only come with the active help
of concerned citizens. But state leadership is a~so needed
to provide expertise and full-time commitment. No matter
what role is given to municipali~ies" a s.tatewide viewpoint
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is needed to insure that always: Scarce resouI'ces are used
to best advantage to resist development pressures. Maine,
for example, has stood firm in the face of an adverse
judicial preeedent2l5 and has not allowed any filling.
It is als'o fortunate to have a highly qualified regulatory
bOdy.216 All the states will have to continue to have
dedicated and resourceful administrators if the wetlands
are to be saved from more "profitable" \lses.
Massachusetts, with its protective orders system,217
has probably had the greatest succ'ess in actively protecting
wetlands ,.Maine, which has the necessary legislation on the
books, has regrettably not followed suit. 2l8 The great
defect of the permit system is that it is passive. It dOles
not seek out the potentially threatened areaS tor preservation
but only seeks to block already .formulated plans. While
in political terms this system may have b~en a necessary
first step, it is both inefficient and risky. It allows the
possibility of having several permit applications involving
the same land over a period of time. Ey waiting until
owners have their development plans in concrete form it
encour~ges them to fight restrictive permits and nelps
courts find extreme diminutions in value. Protective orders
or conservation ea,sements avoid these problem~, but they
are more expensive. Undoubtedly all the states could use
more money for the aequisition of wetlands.
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At the jUdicial level recent court decisions have
been relatively encouraging~ Maine appears to be looking
for a favorable case in the wetlands area with which to try
t th J h d _. 219' b t -t h 1 dto over urn e ~o' nson, eC~Sl.on. U 1. as a rea y
obtained a good land regulation verdict in In re-Spring
Valle¥ Dgvelopment. 220 Massachusetts haS the Dedham22l
decision and Connecticut the Brecciaroli decision. 222 While
the courts have not gone as far as the administrators would
probably like, certainly a shift in jUdicial thinking seems
to be taking place. There is also plenty of room for counsel
to strengthen their arguments in this area as scientific
knowledge in the wetlands area expands.
Clearly the wave of the future is regional and
statewide planning of the coastal zone. Spurred by the
money available under the Coastal Zone Management Act,223
the states are beginning to define the coastal zone and
decide on what they wish to 'regulate. 224 This more complex
tas'k will require much thought about some o,f the same problems
that the wetlands legislation has raised. Clearly the role
of local government units will have to be carefully thought
out. The growth of regional planning agencies may supplan~
whatever roles the municipalities play now! Where to draw
the line between minor, unregulated activities and more
significant, controlled activities will also have to be
rethought. Many New Englanders will not take kindly
to a host of new regulations o'r their land. Many have
complained bitterly about the relatively mild restrictions
of the wetlands legislation. 225 Th,e coastal 'planners will
have an even more difficult time convincing the public of
the necessity of their work than the wetlands advocates did,
but the wetlands experi,ence should be of some help.
certainly the need for overall planning, difficult
as it will be, is there. For While wetlands are parti-
cularly vulnerable to development and the potential
scientific effects of their loss are reasonably well known,
there are many other parts of the coastal zone that need
planning too. Not all of these areas are in their natural
state, but the mix of housing, industry and services, all
of Which want and need some coastal space, should be planned
in the same way as the mix between wetlands and development
needs to be weighed under the present legislation. Just
as it is important for migratory water birds to have a
string of wetlands available along the coast, rather than
226having one large protected area, so it is important that
New England has refineries as well as marinas, vacation
homes as well as nuclear power plants, all spaced
appropriately along the coast. Interstate planning is
thus clearly necessary as well.
The present wetlands legislation will probably be
swallowed up by these more sophisticated planning
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developments, and so it should be. For it serves largely
as a holding mechanism, blocking each proposed development
as it comes along, rather than affirmatively planning for
long-term preservation. Hopefully, despite whatever success
it may have had in reducing the rat,e of despoilation, the
limitations of the wetlands legislation will be admitted
and its virtues not used to block needed reforms.
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FQOTKQ.TES
I. THE NEED FOR PRESERVATION
A. Introduction
1. Unless an explicit distinction is made, "wetlands"
in this paper will refer to coastal, or tidal, wet~
lands. Inland w'etlands have not been discussed here
owing to the limits of time and space. For legis-
lation dealing with their preservation, generally of
more recent origin than coastal wetlands legislation,
s~e Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. [hereinafter cited as Conn.]
22a-36 to -45 (Supp. 1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. [here~
inafter cited as Me.) tit. 38, 380 to 85 (1973) (only
ponds with a surface area greater than 10 acres and
the shore of which is owned by more than one owner are
inclUded); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. [hereinafter cited
as Mass.] ch. 1)1, 40A (1974); N.H. Rev. stat. Ann.
[hereinafter cited as N.H.] 482.41-e (1968), 48)-AI1-
6 (Supp. 1973). 488-AI1-5 (1968>'; R.I. Ge,n Laws Ann.
[hereinafter cited as R.I.] 2-1-8 to -25 (Supp. 1974).
For a definition of coastal wetlands ~ text at note
8 infra.
Tbe states considered in this paper are
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Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island - the five c,oastal New England states.
T'he principal pieces of wetlands legi'slat ion are I
,Conn~cticut - Conn. 22a-28 to -)5 (Supp. 1975)
(preservation of tidal wetlands), 25-4a to -4g
(Supp. 1975) (stream channel encroachment lines);
2.5-1.0 to -17 (Supp. 1975) (removal of sand and
gravel from lands under tidal and coastal waters);
26-17a (Supp. 1975) (acquisition and preservation
of ti.dal wetlands); Connectic\.lt Legislative Service
197), P.A. 73-562 (Environmental Policy Act,
effective February 1, 1975).
Maine - Me. tit. 12, 4701-09 (1974) (permits for
'tidal wetlands); tit. 12, 4701-58 (1974) (zoning
of wetlands); tit. 38, 541 (Supp. 1973) (legislativ,e,
findings, oil pollution).
Massachusetts • Mass. Const. amend. art. XLIX (Supp.
1975) (environmental rigbts); Mass ch. 130, 105
(1964) (protection of coastal wetlands') I c.h. 1)1"
40, 90 (1974) (filling and dredging of coastal
wetlands and violations).
New Hampsbire - N.R. 48J.-AI1-6 (Supp. 1973) (tidal
waters) •
Rhode Island - R.I. Const. amend. art. XXXVIII
(Supp. 1974) (preservation of natural resources);
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R.I. 2-13 to -17 (Supp. 1974) (coastal wetlands);
11-46.1-1 (Supp. 1974) (criminal offenses - inter-
tidal salt marshes). 46-17.1~1 to -2 (Supp. 1974)
(conservation of marine resources).
2. Butman, Estuarine Interactions; Some ConsiderAiions
[hereinafter cited as Butman], in Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, Papers on Nati~
Land Use Policy Issues, 92nd Cong., 1st Session
16)-66 (1971) [hereinafter ,cited as Papers].
At least one court has ordered, in some detail,
the restoration of a destroyed wetland. Unite~
States v. Joseph G. Moretti. Inc., 331 F. Supp. 151
(S.D. Fla. 1971), vacated in Part and remanded, 478
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 197J) , 389 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D. Fla~
1974). Such an order acts primarily as a deterrent
to other greedy developers, for i·t is unknown whether
that area of Key Largo, Florida can ever truly be
restored. The Morettis were particularly flagrant
violators and thus incurred a.particularly costly
penalty.
3. Ducsik, The Crisis im Shoreline Re~reation Lands
in Papers 107.
4. The concern of Congress for the overall planning
aspect is evidenced by the passage of the Coastal
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Zone Mana·gement Act of 1972, 16 U. S.C .A. 14.51-64
(1974), which authorized federal assistance to the
coastal states to help them to set up development
plans for their coastal areas.
5. See text at note 17 infra.
6. Council on Environmental Quality, Second Annual
Report 61 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CEQ, Second].
7. New England i-s one of six areas in the country wi'th
a regional development commission set up under the
Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. )121-3226 (1971), to improve the
economic healtn of "two or more contigUOUS states
related geographically and culturally and lagging
the nation in economic development," With New
York it makes up one of seven interstate river
basin planning and compact commissions, set up
under the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. 1962 (1971), to protect and enhance
the environment. United States Adviso~y Commission
on Intergovernment Relations, Multistate' Regionalism,
.Report 53-55 (1972). F. Bosselman & D. Callies,
The Quiet Reyolution in Land Use Control, 262-289
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Bosselman, ~
Quiet Revoluti,on].
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B. What are' wetlands and why are they important?
8. See text at note 17 infra.
9. R.I. 2-1-14 (Supp. 1974). It is unclear whether the
50 yards is measured from the edge of th.e '''salt
marsh" or "from the tidal waters."
10. Conn. 22a-29(2) (Supp. 197J).
11. N.H. 483-At1,1-a(I) (Supp. 1973).
12. While Rhode Island and Connecticut use the list of
vegetation only as an addi'tional descriptive device.
New Hampshire makes the presence of some of the
listed vegetation mandatory by the omission of the
word "may" fr om the phras e "upon whic h may gr ow
or be capable of growing some, but not necessarily
all, of the following" that is: common to both its
and Connecticut's definitions.
13. Me. tit. 12. 4701 (1974).
14. Mass. ch. 130, 105, ch. 131, 40 (1974).
15. The significance of these differences in the scope
of coverage, along with the accompanying differences
in explicit legislative 'purposes, becomes, more
apparent when one focuses on the arguments used to
justify characterizing restrictions on the use of
wetlands as police power re,gulation as opposed to
the taking of property.
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There are also important definitional differences
in the vertical descriptions of wetlands. 'The
lower, seaward limits do not vary to any great
extent'. Maine uses a boundary of "'extreme low
water." Me. tit. 12, 4701 (1974). Massachusetts'
phrase "lowlandssubje'ct to tidal action, " ~lass.
chI 131, 40 (1974), and New Hampshire'''s "all
lands submerged or f'lowed by mean high tide,"
N.H. 483-A.l-a (I) (Supp. 1973), imply a limit of
mean low water. Connecticut, Conn. 220-29(2)
(SUpp. 1975), and Rhode Island, R.I. 2-1-14
(Supp. 1974), tie their limit to how far out
marsh plants can grow.
The more significant differences are in the
upper, inland boundaries. Connecticut uses "one
foot above' local extreme high water" I New Hampshire
"three and one-half feet above local mean high "tide."
See note 182 infrA. Rhode Island covers up to
50 yards inland. ,~note 9 supra. Maine and
Massachusetts imply a mean high tide line. State
control, of land below the low water mark is clear -
control above that depends on the water law of the
particular state.
16. J • .& M. Teal" 1ife and Death of the ~l:t Marsh,
2)9 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Teal]; CEQ, Second,
supra note 6 at 2)8.
17. Tripp, The Ecological, Importance' of a Salt Marsh
[hereinafter c.ited as Tripp], in Papers, supra
note 2 at 174.
18. T~al 193.
19. Id. 182-8), 200-01.1 Butman, in Papers, supra
note 2, at 163-64. Tripp, in Papers l71-72
(Tripp uses a figure of 90%)1 CEQ, Second 236.
20. Main,e Department of Environmental Protection,
Prot,ecting Your Coastal Wetlands. A Cit izen' s
Guide to the Wet1aQ4s Law 5 (1974).
"
21. Gannon, Constitutional ImPlicat~Qns of Wetlang~
Legisla.tion. 1 Envir,onmental Affairs 654, 654-55
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Gannon].
22. "The sports fishery depends up«Yn the coastal estu-
aries even more than does the commercial fishery,
and much more money is involved••.. [in 1965J four
million sports fishermen spent about ~our hundred
million do11BrS on all aspects 01 their sport."
Teal 204.
23. Teal 205-091 Tripp, in Paper§ 17).
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Conn. 25-10 (Supp. 19(5).
Conn. 25-7b to ... 7f (Supp. 19(5) .'
Conn. 22a-28 to -35 (Supp. 1975).
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSg
A. The Evolution of the Present Legislation
and Legislatiye Findings
24. Mass. ch, IJ1, 40 (1974), formerly ch. 1)0, 27A,
[1963J Mass. Acts & Resolves, ch, 426.
25. Mass. ch, 1)0, 105 (1914).
26. R,I. 2-1-13 to -17 (Supp. 19(4)
27. R.I. 11-46.1-1 (Supp. 19(4)
28. Me. tit. 12 4701-09 (1974), N.H. 483-AI 1-5
(Supp. 19(3).
29,.
30.
31.
32. Mass. Canst. amend. art. XLIX (Supp. 19(5). R.I.
Const. amend. XXXVII (Supp. 19(4). The latest version
of the Massachuse~ts provision, adopted in 1972, states
that people have a right to "the na,tura1 ••. quali ties
,of their environment" and that t'he conservation ,of
natural resources is a pUblic purpose. The new article
I, l7 of Rhode Island's constituti,on, adopted in 1970,
states thatt:he old "rights of fishery and the
priv1eges of the shore" continue and that it is
the duty of the legislature lito provide for the
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c'onservation of the •.•.natural resources of the
state" and to provide adequa.te planning and regulation
"for the pr,eservation, regeneration and restoration
of the natural enviro·nment of the state."
)). R.I. 2-1-1) (Supp. 1974). There is also a general
s.tate'ment olf concern for the' environment in l1970]
R.I. Laws", ch. 162, the preamble to the legislation
setting up the Council of Environmental Quality.
R.I. 42-52-1 to -7 (Supp. 1974).
34 . Conn. 22a-28 (Suprp. 1975)1.
35. N.H. 483-A,1-b (Supp. 1973).
)6. Me. tit. 12, 4701 (1974).
37. Mass. ch. 130, 105, ch. 131, 40 (1.974).
)8. Me. tit. )8, 481-88 (Supp,. 1973). For a diseussion
of this law~ Bosse1man, The Quiet ~eyo1utiQn, §upra
note 7. at 187-204.
39. Me. tit. 12, 4811-14 (1974),(Supp. 1974-75).
40. Me. tit. J8 t 541-57 (Supp. 1973). This act waS
held constitutional in Portland Pipe Line ~rp. v.
Eqrironmental Improvement Common. 307 A.2d (1973).
the court finding, the state's power to regulate in
the need to preserve the environment.
41. Connecticut Legislative Service 197.3,. P.A.. 7.3-562.
Passed in 1973, this act became ef£ective
February 1, 1975.
42.
43.
Mass. ch. 30,
Mass., chI 130,
61~62 (Supp. 1975).
105 (1974).
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B. Regulated Activities
44. Teal. supra note 17, at 2411 Counci] on Envir-
onmental Quality, First Annual Report 177 (1970
[hereinafter cite~ as CEQ. First].
45. Conn. 22a-29(3), 25-10 (Supp. 1975). Me. tit. 12,
4'70Jl. (1974), Mass. chI 131, 4'0 (1974) J N.H. 48J-Asl
(Supp. 1973). R.I. 11~46.1-1 (Supp. 1974).
46. Mass. ch. 130, lOS (1974). Me. tit. 12, 4701 (1974).
Presumably the other states control the pollution
of wetlands in other, more general legislation.
47. Conn. 2S-4a (Supp. 1975),. This provision, whi'ch
allows the Commissioner of Environmental Protection
to establish lines beyond which such encroachments
may not extend, is primarily designed as a flood
control meaaure. The lines must be based on previous
flood history, 25-4b (SUpp. 1975), and have no
relation to the extent of wetlands
48,. R. I. 2-1-15 (Supp. 1974).
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C. Permit Application Pr_ocedures
1. state versus local authorit~
49. For simplicity flmunicipality" is used throughout
this paper to refer to the lOcal government bOdy
involved, regardless of its true title, except
where the powers of the actual unit are being dis-
c,us,sed. Some of the states g,lve a role to munlei'pal
bodies below the level of the chief executive
official. Conn. 22a-J2 (Supp. 1975), 'Mass. ch. 1)1,
40 (1974);, N.H. U-8J-A.a4-a (IV) (Supp. 197),.
50. Conn. 22a-)2 to -:33 (Supp. 1975h R.I. 11-46.1...1,
46-17.1-2, 46-23-6(D) (b) (Supp. 1974). Rhode ISland
appears to have created an overlapping authority
over dredge or fill permits between the Director
of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the
Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMe). The
CRMC was set up in 1973, perhaps in response to the
federal Coastal Zone Management Act Of 1972, 16
U.S.C.A., 1451-64 (1974,), to '"preserve, protect,
develop and, Where possible r restore the coastal
resources" of the state. 46.2)-1 (SuPP. 1974).
It consists of 17 members representing the legis-
lature, coastal and non-coastal residents and
municipal officials I and the DNR. They are appo,inted
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for varying terms by diffe~ent, elected state
offieials. 46-23-2 (Supp. 1974). The CRMC is
given specific au-othority to issue permit,s for dredging
or filling wetlan~s. 46-23-6(0) (b) (Supp. 1974)~
But curiously embedded in the criminal offences
,section, 11-17.1-2 (Supp. 1974,), is a provision
that the DNR issues permits f,or dredging or filling.
51. Fo,r its normal!. funct i.ons of building dams and managing
reservoirs, the Water Resources Board (WR~) consists
o~ five directors appointed by the governor.
N.H. 481.J-4 (1968, Supp. 1973). But for
"carrying out the provisions of law conferring
upon the water resources board authority to decide
mat~e~s relative to resources of the state, including••.
excavating, dredging and filling waters of the state,"
a special board, consisting of the members of the
\fRB, "the director of fish and game marine biologist
[sicJ, biologist for fisheries, commissioner of safety,
executive director of water supply and pollution
control oommission, chief aquatic biologist of the
water supply and pollution control cO1Qlissi,on , the
commissioner of highways', cODJDl'\8sioner of resources
and economic development, director Qf the division
of parks, director of planning and research in the
division of economic development," has been set up.
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[1971] N.H. Laws, 'ch. :)29.
52. N.H. 483-Aa4-a (IV) (Supp. 1973).
5). The Board of Environmental Protection consists of 10
gubernatorial appointees - two each representing
manufacturing, municipalities, the public and con-
servation, and two persons "knowledgeable" about
air pollution - and the Commiasioner of Environmental
Protection. Me. tit. 38, 361 (Supp. 1974-75), This
composition was held to be reasonable and not arbitrary
in In Fe Maine Clew Fuels,. I[lp., 310A. 2d 736 (1973).
54. Me. tit. 12, 4702 (Supp. 1974).
55. Mass. chI 1)1, 40 (1974). For a survey of other
state legislation and how it deals with this s~ate -
lOcal issue, see Note, state Land Use Regulation -
A suryey of Recent Legislatiye Approaches, 56 Minn.
L. Rev. 869, 898-911 (1972).
56. Conn. 7-1)la (Supp. 1975>' Mass. chI 40, 8e. (1958}a
N.H. 36-Aal-6 (1971, Supp. 1973) I R.I. 45-35-1,
to ....4 (1971). CEQ, First, supra note 46, at 312-14.
57. Mass. chI 1)1, 40 (1974). N.H. 48J-Aa4-a (IV)
(SuPP. 197J) '. In New Hampshire the conservation
commission must notify the Water Resources Board
within 7 days of the filing of the original .appli-
cation with the Board ~f it wants to delay the
Board's proceedings and make its own investigation.
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Ye~ the local commission must receive its copy of the
apPlication from the Town Clerk, with the result
that there is very little time for the commission to
act. Since 483-A.2 (Supp. 1973) allows the Board
30 days Within which to have a hearing, the 7 day
time limit seems excessively short. If the purpose
of 48J-a.4-a (IV), added in 1973. is to give local
communities a greater chance to participate in
permit decisions, the reservation 'of the pow.er to
delay only to the local conservatiDn commission,
Which may not even e~ist, ~ather than including the
mayor or town manager if there is no commission,
seems self-defeating. Surely the municipality's
interest in being able to investigate an application
does fiot depend upon its having a conservatinn com-
mission, a~though it may be that the change was designed
to encourage the formation of such commissions.
58. Golden Vt aQ~d of Select~, 358 Mass. 519, ~65
N.E.2d 57.3 (1970). Some municipalities in Massachusetts
have imposed strict zoning regulations of their own for
wetlands preservation. Bosselman, The Quiet Reyolution,
supra note 7, at 214. One important case upholding
such zoning was Turnpike Realtv Co. y, Uedbam, 1972
Mass. Ad. She 1)03, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied,
409 u.s. 1108 (197'3), discussed in more detail in "text
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at note 12'7 infra_
59. Me. Tit. 12, 4702 (1974).
60. Bosselman, The Quiet Reyo1ution 320.
2. Submission of the APplication
61. Conn. 22a-J2 (SuPP. 1975), Me. tit. 12, 4701 (1974);
Mass. ch. 1)1, 40 (1914); N.H. 48)-A.1 (Supp. 1973);
R.I. 11-46.1-1, 46-17.1-2, 46~2J-6(B), (D) (b)
(Supp. 1974). Unless otherwise specified Rhode
Island's legislation contains no detailed require-
ments for any aspect of the permit procedure
requirements described in the text and accom-
panying notes. ~ note 48 supra.
62. Maine's procedures require the issuance or d·enial
lof a permit within the· 60 day period, but New
Hampshire's do not, raising the possibility that
work could legally commence before a decision
has been made. That reau,lt would seem to defeat
the purposes of the otherwise carefully worked
out legislative scheme of permit examination.
6). Conn. 22a-J2 (Supp. 1975), Me. tit. 12, 4'701 (1974) J
Mass. ch. 1)1. 40 (1974) I N.H. 48J-'A.2 {Supp, 197J)J
R.I. 46~17'.1-·2 ( Supp. :t974) • CCimnect iC.ut allows
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public hearings to be waived if the Commissioner
of the Department of Environmental Protection
"determines that the regulated activit,y for which a
permit is sought is not likely to have a s,ignificant
impaot Oil the wetland," but he must put a notice
to that effect in the local newspaper, and if 25
people request a hearing he ~ust have one. The
New Ramps'hire statute gives the Water Resources
Board similar discretion, but without any provis:ion
for a group to overrule its deciSion. Connecticut's
statute requiring permits for structures in tidal
coastal or navi~ble waters, Conn. 25-7b to -7f
(Supp_ 1975), has been held not, to require a public
hearing. Bloom y,. Water Resources COM'n, 157 Conn.
528, 254 A.2d 884 (1969). This holding was upheld
in HotchkiSS Gr9xe Ass'n .. y •. water Resources Comm'n,
161 Conn. 50, 282 A.2d 890 (1971), with the justifi-
oation that ~he provision for a judicial appeal,
with a resulting hearing, was SUfficient.
64. Maine's system of a relatively informal municipal
hearing was attacked as not necessarily providing
for the presentation of the state'S possibly adverse
interest and as not com;plying '-wit,h due process
legislative requirements" because the Board of
Environmental Protection- s decision was made .1n
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~amerij, and no record was kept, of thepubli.c hearing
of the Board's deliberations. Halperin, Consermtion
PQliey and the Role of Counsel, 23 Me.L.Rev. 119,
]J8~40 (l971) [hereinafter cited as Halperin].
The present policy of the Board, however, is to
conduct its own public hearing when there is any
showing of pUblic interest in the application,
such as people writing the Board. A full record is
kept and parti-cipants are allowed to be represented
by counsel. Th.e Board's collect,ive deliberations
and voting are pUblic. Department of Environmental
Protection, Regul~tiQns for Hearings on ARplicati~DS
(1964). [Hereinafter cited as Maine, Regulations].
The statutory language is ,at Me. tit. 38, 361
(Supp. 1974-75).
65. Maine allows a municipality or the Board of
Environmental Protection to defer action on an
application beyond the normal )0 day period by up
to 120 days, if winter conditions prevent proper
evaluation of the ,application. No work:. however,
may be done on the project in the me~time.
Me. tit. 12, 4701 (1974).
66. Conn. 22a-32 (supp. 1,975) (15 days prior), Mass.
chI 131, 40 (1974). It may be that administr.ative
practice provides fair warning to the persons the
-82-
legis,lat'ion requires to be informed" but such a
requirement of basic fairness should be in the
legislation itself. Maine's Department of Environ-
mental Protection Reguli~ion§ does specify a 10 day
notice period.
67. Connecticut is the only state not to list th~
applicant specifically, but given the otherwise
careful and detailed provisions in Conn. 22a-32
(Supp. 1975), that seems an inadvertent oversight.
68. Connecticut sensibly requires all the recipients
of applications to be notified. Massachusetts
includes the municipal board of health and planning
board, although they do not receive copies of the
application. Mass. ch. 131, 40. (1974).
69. Connecticut includes both, Maine and New Hampshire
only the former. New Hampshire's provision,
N.H. 48j-!a 2-a (Supp. 1973), was first added in 1973.
70. Massachusetts, Department of Public Works. New
Hampshire, Department of Public Works and Highways.
the state Office of Planning and Research, Division
of Economic Development, Water Supply and Pollution
Control Commission and FiSh and Game Department.
71. Only Rhode Is1and is silent, although New Hampshire's
requirement was only added in 197J. N.H. 483-AI
2-a (Supp. 1973).
-8J-
72. S'ee note 64 supre..
73. Maine, Regu1itioDP.
4. The Decision
74. Me. tit. 12, 4702 (1974)1 Mass. chi 1)1, 40 (1974).
75. Conn. 22a-3) (Supp. 1975), Me. tit. 12~ 4702 (1974).
Ma'6S. chI 131, 40 (1974); N.H. 483-A,4-a(III)
(Supp. 19'73h R.I. 46-17.1-2 (SupP,. 19(4).
76. Such language would seem ~o er~ate a bias in favor
of the existing use if the decision making body and
the adjoining owner wished to maintain it. If develop-
ment were planned, that would clearly affect the
enjoyment of neighbo~ing, conservationist owners.
If one developer has another developer as a neighbor,
this ground for denial would not be available to the
decision maker.
77. ~ text at notes 127-141 intra.
5. permit Conditions
78. Conn. 2'2a-33 (SuPP. 1975); Me. tit. 1Z; 4702
(1974) I Mass. chI 1)1, 40 (1974), ,N.H. 48J-A.),
4~1 (III) (Supp. 19(3), R.I. 46-23-6(B) , (D)
( Supp. 19(4).
79. Me. tit. 12, 4702 (1974). If the permit is ,not
so recorded within 30 days it becomes void.
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80. Mass. ch. 1.31, ~O (1974). N.H. 48.3-A.4-b
'(Supp. 197.3).
81. Me. tit. 12, 4702 (1974).
6• Entercement
82. Conn. 22a--J5 (SUpp. 1975) ('no mo:t'e than $1000)'1 Me.
tit. 12, 4709 (1974) (no more than $500); Mass. ch.
IJ1, 40 (1974) (no more than $1000 and/or six months);
N.H. 48.3-AI 5,6 (SuPP. 1973) (no more than $5000 for
violation ,of order of Water. Resources Board" t'he pro-
ceeds to be used for restoration or wetlands research;
misdemeanor for 'violation of section by natura.!
person, felony by anyone else). R.I. 11-46.1~1 (Supp,
1974) ($500 for violation of s,ection, half to state,
half to co,mplainant I $50/day for violation ,of ot"der
of Directcor of Departme'nt of Natural Resources,),
46-17.1-1 (19(4) (no more than $1000 and/or one year).
Connecticut, Massachusetts and New Hampshire make
explicit the normal assumption that the Attorney
General is the official responsible for enforcing
~hese provisions.
8.3. Conn. 2'2a-J5 (Supp. 1975) I Me. tit. 12, 4709
(1974) I R.I. 11-46.1-1 (Supp. 19(4),
84. Co,nn,. 22a-J3 (Supp. 19(5). H'.I. 46-17.1-2
(Supp. 19(4). Rhode' Island' s provision only
85.
-85'"
~pplies to permits allowing the transporting
and d~mping of waste materials. A state inspector
is ~equired to oversee comp1i'ance with any
conditions.
Co,nn. 22a-35 (Supp. 1975)( Me. tit. 12,
(1974)1 Mass. ch. 131, 40 (1974), N.H.
(Supp. 1973).
86. Mass. chi 12, 110 (Supp. 1975). N.H. 7-18-a to c
(Supp. 1973).
87. Mass. chi 131, 40 (1974).
88. N.H. 483~AI4-b (Supp. 1973).
89. Me. tit. 12 J502-B (1974).
90. R.I. 42-17.1-4(f) (Supp. 1974). As of 1973 this
division. also enforces "all of the laws and regulations
of the department and the coastal resources manage~ent
council."
9'1. ~ text at .note 73 supra.
7. Appeals and Relief
92. Mass. chi 1]1, 40 (1974). The municipality and the
original applicant; if anothe~ person is asking
the Department for a determination, are notified
of any such request and can presumably make their
views known.
-86-
93. ~ note 64 supra.
94. Conn. 4-166 to -184 (Supp. 1975) (within 10 days).
95. N.H. 483-AI4(I)r )1. 74 (SuPP. 197).
96. Conn. 22a-)4(a) (Supp. 1975) (Within JO days).
Me. tit. 12 r 4704 (1974) (Within. 30 days) J
N.H. 483-AI4(1), )1'74 (Supp. 1973) (within 20
days).
97. Me. tit. 12., 4704 (1974). It reads. "Appeal
may be taken ••• for the purpose of determining
whether the action ap~ealed from so restricts
the use of the property as to deprive the owner
of the reasonable use thereof or which constitutes
the equivalent of a taking without compensation."
The language does not give a conservation group
an opportunity to challenge the grantin& of a permit.
98. Mass. ch. 30A, 1-17 (1966, SUpp. 1975), as ~ended,
[1973] Mass. Acts & Re.solves, ch •. 1114 r 1-);
R.I. 42-J5~1 to -15 (1970).
99. Conn. 22a-34(a) (supp. 1975). Me. tit. 12, 4704
(1974); N.H. 483-AI4(II) (Supp. 1973).
100. Conn. 22a-J4(a) (Supp. 1975), damages to be awarded
under *8-12 (Supp. 1975), N.H. 48J-AJ4(II)
(SuPP. 1973). damages to be assessed under
482.25-28 and 481110(II~III) (1968). New Hampshire
also specifically requires that "the public purpose
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standards of this chapter" be met.
The jUdicial decIsions regarding takings are
discussed beginning at note 116 infra.
D. Administratiye Qrder~
101. Me. tit. 12, 4'754-56 (1974) I Mass. chi 130,
105 (1974).
102. Mass. ch. 21, 2-2A (1973). The Board controls
the Department of Natural Resources and consists
of 5 members, appointed by the Governor "with
due regard to ge,ographical di.stribution." The
members are to be "qualified in the field o~
natural resources or in the work of the depart-
ment."
10). This description of the Massachusetts procedure
has been taken from BosseLman, The Quiet Revolu-
~, supra note 7, at 205-16.
104. R.I. 46-2J-6(A) (Supp. 1974).
105. ~. 46-2)-6(B).
106. 16 U.S.C.A. 1451-64 (1974).
107. Bosselman, ~h, 'Quiet Reyolytion 205, ~09.
III. JUDICIAL REJOINDERS
A. The Present S!aj;us
108. Brecciaro1i y. Commissioner of Enyironmental
Protectiqn, Conn. L.J~ (Sup, ct.), Apr. 15, 1975.
Vartela§ v. water ~esources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650,
153 A.2d 822 '(1959) I Shorehayen Golf Club. I~iJ
y, Water Resources COmm'n, 146 Conn. 619, 153
A.2d 444 (1959), Bykar Industrial Corp. y. Gill,
4 E.L.R. 20226 (Conn. SupeT. Ct. Dec. 11, 1973),
State y. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970), Qom-
missioner of Natural Resources y.S. Volpe & Co'.,
349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). ~~­
son v. State, 110 N.H. 8, 259 A.2d 397 (1969).
109. Brecciaroli v. Commissioner of Environmental
Protection, Conn. L. J. (Sup. Ct.), Apr. 15, 1975;
Hotchkiss GrQY~ Asa'n v. water Resources Comm'n,
161 Conn. 50, 282 A.2d 890 (1971), Blanev y. Bit-
tal, )12 A.2d 522 (Me. 1973), In re Maine Clean
Fuels. Inc., )10 A.2d 736 (Me. 197); $tate y.
Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (iMe. 1970). COmmissioner of
Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., )49 Mass.
104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
110. All states have constitutional pt-ovisions that
-88-
111.
112.
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any taking of private property for public purposes
must be' compensated. Conn. Canst. art. I, 11
(1967), Me. Const. art. I, 21 (1965). Mass Canst.
Pt. 1, art. X (1958)1 N.H. Canst. Pt. I, art. XII
(1971); R.I. Const. art. I, 16 (1957). For some
of the historical background ~o these provisions
see F. Bosse1man, D. Callies & J. Banta, ~
Taking IssueJk An Analysis ot the Cpnstitutional
Limits of Land Us~ Control, 82-104 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Bosselman, The Taking Issue].
Delogu, ~he Wetlan2s Decision 'Is Absurd, Maine
Times, June 12, 1970; at 8, col.l [hereinafter
cited as Delo,gu I], Gannon supra note 21 at 654,
Comment, _l'he Wetlands Statutes. Regulation or
Taking?, 5 Conn. L. Rev. 64 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Conn. Comment]r Note, §tate and Local
Wetlands Regulatianl The Problem _of Taking.
Without Just Compensation, 58 Va. L. Rev. 876
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Va. Note].,
Some of the Ma,jor supreme Court cases are,.
Goldblatt v. Hempste~d. 369 u.s. 590 (1962)J
United States v. Causby, 328 u.s. 256 (1946)J
Miller Y. Schoene, 276 u.s, 272 (1928), Pennsul-
vania Coal Co, y, Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
Hadacheck x, Sebastian, 239 U.s. 394 (1915);
PQwel1 v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (l887);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.s. 623 (1887).
113. For discussions of that history~ Bosse1man,
The Taiin~ Issue 105"'38, Michelman" Property,
Unity and Fairness I comments on the Ethical
FoundationS of "Just CQmp~nsation" Law, 80 Harv.
L. Rev. 1165, 118)-99 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Michelman]. Sax, Takings ~d the Poli,e Po~,
74 Yale L.J. 37, 38-4) (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Sax I].
114. Sax, TakiDaJI. Private Pr operty and Public Hights ,
81 Yale L.J. 149, 149-50 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Sax IIJ.
115. rg. 151. As sax points out this theory only
takes into account "the owners ability to profit
from the piece of property••• considered bv itself., II
(emphasis in original)" But in the case of
wetlands this standard is inadequate both because
it only looks at the diminution in value to the
owner and not to society at large, and because
the measure of loss is incomplete. As one govern-
ment study concluded. "The va~ues of the estuarine
zone as a fish and Wildlife habitat, as a recre-
ational facility, and as an aesthetic experience
are perhaps greater than they are for commercial
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exploitation, but unf'ortlUlately, we, have no,t
yet developed the ability to adequately
express these social and humanistic values in
quantitative terms." United States Department of
Interior, water Pollution Control Administration.
The Ngiional Estuarin~ Pollution Study 40 (1970).
116. 265 A.2d '7ll(Me. 1970).
117. Gannon, supri note 21, at 654. Halperin, supra
note 64, at 1)1-)2. Waite, Public Rights in Maine
WAters, 17 Me. L. Rev. 161 (1965).
118,. 151 Conn. 304, 19'7 A.2d 770 (1964) (restrictive flood
plain zoning struck down as confiscatory).
119. 265 A.2d at 715.
~20. 161 Conn. 24, 31, 282 A.2d 907, 910 (1971) (restric,tive
zoning of wetlands held confiscatory because of
extreme diminution in value).
121. 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
122. 265 A.2d at 715-16.
123. [1963J Mass. Acts & Resolves, ch. 426, AS amended
Mass. 131, 40 (1974).
124. 349. Mass. at 111-12, 206 N.E.2d ,at 671-[72.
Among the qu.estions asked were. 1) what are
the uses of the property in its natural state,
both independent of any other land owne4 by the
developer and in conj'unction with s'uch land,
2) what has been the property's assess,ed value
in the past, J) what Was the cost of the prope~ty
to the owner, 4) what is the present fair market
value 0 f t he ,property, both with the res.tr i ct ions
in the permit and without them., 5) what are the
estimated costs of the proposed project, 6) would
there be a taking if the restriction prevented
the owner from gett~ng a fair return on a) his
investment. b) the fair maJ;'ket value wit'hout
restrictions, 7) is it revelant that the land
may have other uses, and 8) is it relevant that
the site is now not suitable for development?
125. Bosselman, The Quiet Bevolution, ~upra note
7, at 216 J Conn. CotnI!'lent" supra note Ill, at 91.
~26. Michelman, supra note 113, at 1166.
127. 1972 Mass Ad. Sh. IJ'O), 284 N.E. 2d 891, ~.
denied, 409 u.s. 1108 (1973).
128. IS. at 1J08, 284 N.E. 2d at 896.
129_ 146 Conn. 650, 15J A.2d 822 (1959).
1)0. 1972 Mass. Ad. Sh. at 1314, 284 N.E. 2d at 899.
1)1. l,g. at 1315, 284 N. E. 2,d at 900. One recent
case that did focus on the diminution in value
question in a way favorable to the preservation
of wetlands was Just y. Marinette County, 56
Wi.se. 2d 7, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972). In upholding
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the denial of a permit to fill an inland wetland,
the court said that "this depreciation of value
is not based on the use of land in its natural
state but on what the land would be worth if it
could be filled and used for the location of
a dwelling. While loss of' vah~e is to be con-
sidered in determining Whether a restriction is a
constructive taking, value based upon changing
the character of the land at the expense of harm
to public rights is not an ,essential factor or
controlling." 56 Wisc. 2d at 23, 201 N.W. 2d at
771.
132. 284 N.E. 2d at 901-02.
133. Conn. L.J. (Sup. C~), Apr. 15, 1975, at 4.
134. M. 6
135. 148 Conn. 299, 170 A.2d 267 (1961).
lJ6. Conn. L.J. (Sup. Ct.), Apr. 15, 1975, at 6.
137. 146 Conn. at 656, 153 A.2d at 825.
138'. Conn. L.,J. (SUp. Ct.), Apr. 15 .. 1975, at 6.
The situation was identical to the one in the
Johnson case, but whereas the Connecticut court
was willing to force the owner to try to find
a less harmful alternative, the Maine court was
not.
139. lQ. 5.
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140. 265 A.2d at 716; 349 Mass. at 106-7, 206 N.E. 2d
at 668-69. The Johnson c'ourt, however, felt that
the public .should bear the costs of preservation.
More recently, in a case involving the site
development law, Me. tit. 38, 481-88 (Supp. 1973),
~ note )8 supra, the Maine C'ourt stat,ed I "It
s,eems self-evident in these times of increased
awareness of the relationship of the environment
to human health ~nd welfare that ••.• the. stat·e
may justifiably limit the use which .some own·ers
may make of their property. O'ur law has long
recognized that a landowner holds his property
sUbject to the limitation that he may not use
it to the serious disadvantage of the public.·'
In re Spring Valley Dey., 300 A.2d 736, 746
(Me. 1973).
141. Council on Environmental Quali.ty, Fourth Annual
R'eport 143 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CEQ, Fourth].
142. )69 u.s. 590 (l962).
143. Conn. L. J. (Sup., Ct.), Apr. IS, 1975, at 5.
144. 369 u.s. at 594.
B. Alternative Solutions
145. Conn. 26-17a (Supp. 1975);' Me. tit . .33, 668
(Supp. 1973); Mass. ch. 1)-2A, 3-3A 1(1974) J
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N.H. J6-As6 (1971). R.I. 32-4-2 to -15 (1969),
45-36-2 (1971).
146. 4 Nichols' l,aw of Eminent Domain 12.)14
(rev. 3d ed. 1974).
147. There is little likelihood that present economic
conditi,ons in the New England states will allow
much room for wetlands acquisition in their budgets.
See Boston Sunday Globe, April 6, 1975, at 29,
col. 4-6.
148. Conn. 26-17a (Supp. 1975). Me. tit. JJ, 667-68
(Supp. 1973); Mass. chI 184, 3l-JJ (Supp. 1975).
N.H. 36-A14 (1971).
149. ~ text at notes 102-103 supra.
150. De1ogu, Land Use Control Principles Applied ]"Q
QIfshore Coastal Waters, 59 Ky. L.J. 606, 62)
(1971). Note, Toe Public Trust. in Tidal Areas I
A Sometime Submerged Doctrine, 79 Yale L.J.
762, '770 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note J.
151. Hearings on L.D. 395 and L.D. 730 before the ~ine
Joint Committee on Natural Resources, l07t'h Le.g. ,
April 17, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Maine Hearings].
152. Maine Hearings.
153. Maine Hearings.
C. Arguments for Police Power Regulation
1. Alternative uses of wetlands
154. Halperin, supra note 64, at 123-25.
155. Wilkes" ~gnstitutional Dilemmas Posed by State
Policies Against Marine Pollution - The Main~
Example, 23 Me. L. Rev. 14), (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Wilkes],
156. Harris, Enyironmental RegulaDODsl Zoning an~
Withheld Municipal Services. Takings of Property
bx Multi-Government Action, 25 U. Fla. L, Rev.
635. 635-6 (1973).
157. Bo~selman, 1he Taking Issue, supra note 110,
at 284-87.
2.. The Nuisance Argument·
158. Sax II, supra note 114, at 150-55. Sax goes OD
to talk of the important case Where the harm
to neighboring property is too diffuse to be
measurable, and he discusses the need in such
situations for the public interest as a Whole
to be considered. 12. 155-60. This point
will be consi4ered With What is called here the
'public trust argument, beginning at note 177 infra.
159. See t,ext at note 2 supra.
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160. Halperin 126-28. Needless to say, this concession
hardly helped their position.
161. CEQ" Foyrtb, supra note 141, at, 14-5-46.
162. 151 Conn. )04, 197 A~2d 770 (1964).
16). ~. at 311, 197 A.2d at 77).
164. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
165. Wilkes, /su'Qra note 155 at 157.
166. Sax II 169.
167. Waite, Ransoming the Maine Enyironment, 2) Me.L.
Rev. 103, 117n.66 (1971).
168. Id. 118 (footnote omitted), 118n.67.
169. SQuth ~erminal Corp. y. Enyironmental Protection
Agency, 504 F.2d 646, 678 (1974). We may wish
to develop a system whereby the loss of develop-
ment rights in one area can be compensated. for
by giving new or expanded development rights
elsewhere, but this concept is still in its
infancy,. ~ ilagman, Book Review, 87 Hax'v. L. Rev.
482, 493-94 (1973).
170. The particular importance of wetlands may give
them a special status in tnat property owners are
put on notice that they cannot legitimate~y expect
to use their land in such a way as to destroy
its usefulness to society. ~ text at notes
204-06 ,infra.
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171. Note, Coastal Wetlands in New GJlgland. 52 B.U.L.
Rev. 724, 759-60 (1972) [hereinafter cited as B.U.
Note ].
172. Miller y. SchoeD&. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
173. Consolidated Rock Products v. Los AngeJ..u, 57' Cal.
2d 5,15, 370 P.2d ]42 (1962), appe'a! dismisged,
371 u.s.J6 (1962).
174. ,Mug1e; y. KAJ1§as, 12) U. S. 623 (1887).
1.75,. Powell y. PeoosylYania, 127 u.s. 678 (1887).
176. ,~ee text at notes 198-99 infra.
3. The Public Trust Argument
177. A number of commentators have suggested that the
public trust doctrine might be of use in arguing
that the regulation of wetlands is not a taking.
Bosse1man, ~he Taking Issue, supra note 110, at
309-13; Wilkes, supra note 155, at 15)-54; Conn.
Comment, syp[a note Ill, at 96-97, Va. Note,
supra note Ill, at 895-99. What follows is an
attempt to refine its application and to expand
the argument specifically in relation to the New
England coastal states.
178. 1 Waters and water Rights 37.2(c), at 208-09,
J6.J(B). at 192-9] (R. C,lark ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as Clark].
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179. Id. 37.4(A), at 213-17. While a state may
sell or give away its prop~ty, no state has said
that' "the pUblic interest may be alien,at,ed in fee
to privat,e persons without regard to the utility
and need of the people for navigation, and witho~t
assurance that the property will be used to promote at
least a quasi-public purpose" ••• " IJ1. 36.4(A), at 196.
180. Ch. 43" of the Colonial Ordinance, quoted i.n 2
H.. Henry & D. Halperin, Maine Law Affecting Marw
Resources 189 (1969) [hereinafte~ cited as Henry], reads I
"It is declared" that in all creeks, coves and othel'
places about and upon salt water, where the sea ebbs
and flows, the proprietor, or the land adjoining, shall
have propri,ety to the low water mark, where the sea
doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more where-
soever it ebbs further, prGvided that such proprietor
shall not by this liberty have power to stop or hinder
the passage of boats or other vessels, in or through
any sea, creeks or coves, to other men's houses or
lands."
181. Commonwealth X, Alger, 61 Mass. (7 cusht') ,53
(1851) J Clark 36.3(C), at 193-94; Henry 188.
The ordinance applies to Maine Which was a
part of Massachusetts until 1820, even though
parts of Maine w,ere not under' the control lof the
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Massachu$~tts Bay Colony when the Ordinance was
passed. The law in New Hampshire as to the
applicability of the Colonial Ordinance appears
somewhat unsettled, but the weight of what
autho~ity there is favors its nonapplicability.
Certain parts of Rhode Island, originally belong-
ing to Massachusetts, may be sUbject to the
Colonial Ordinance. B.U. Note 731-'5.
182. The natural balance poin~ as a wetland builds
i t'self up and is torn down by the elements is
about one foot above high water. Above that
there is less grass and thus erosion; below,
sedimentation and growth. Teal, supra 'note 16
at 61-62.
183. "Foreshore" is used to mean the tideland between
the high and low water marks.
184. Clark J6.4(B), at 200-02, Schoenbaurn, 'Public
Rights and coa§tal Zone Managemen~, 51 NiC.L.
Rev. 1, 6-7, 16-17 (1972), Yale Note, supra
note 150, at 763-74.
185. State y. KnOWles-Lombard QQ, 122 C~nn, 26), 188 A. 275
(1963') I Rochester y. Barney" 117 Conn. 462, 169 A. 45
(1933), R. Reis, connecticut Water Law. Judicial
Allocation at Water- Resources 107·20 (1967) (herein-
aft,er cited as Reis]. Recreational rights include
below the high water mark.
Reis 131.
146 Conn. 619, 153 A.2d 444 (1959) .
21 Corm.. Supp,. 407 (Super. Ct. 1959) •
4 E.L.R~ 29226 (Conn. Super. ct . Dec. 11, 1973).
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swimming and boating. "sea produce" rights include
flshing,shell"'fi,shing, and collecting s'ea weed
186.
187.
188,
189.
190. I,g. 20228.. The opinion gave a very complete
description of' the functions of a wetland& "As
hydrologic sponges they absorb, large amounts of
water during severe tides, thus containing the spread
of flood waters. As balance wheels in the
ecosystem, they sop up excess nutrients for later
release when the nu"tri.ent supply is low. As sedi-
men~ary catch basins, they serve as natural deposi'"
tories for accumulations of sediment brought in
by the tide, thus keeping the channels free for
navigation. As nurseries, they supply nutrients
to ,shell-.fish, crustaceans and other marine life.
As natural refuges they act as habitats for wild
I1fe and as a way station for migratory watert'owl.··
191. 146 Conn. at 625-26, 153 A.2d at 441.
192. 110 N.H. 8, 10, 259 A.2d 397, (1969).
193. Conn. 22a-29 (2) (SuPP. 1975).
194. ~ E.L.R. at 20228.
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195. ~ note 180 supra.
196. The Mas'sachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court was clearly
interested in this issue as it asked counsel in
the Volpe case to consider on remand the relevance
of the Colonial Ordinance. )49 Mass. 104, 112, 206
N.E. 2d 666, 672 (1956).
197. Henry, supra note 180, at 2)6-40.
198. Dver y. Curtis, 72 Me. 181, 184 (1881).
199. lS. at 186.
200. HenrY y. Newburyport, 149 Mass. 582, 585 (1889).
201. Henry, supra note 180, at 190, JOl~OJ.
202. Teal, supra note 16, at 196.
20). S~e p. 2 supra.
204. CEQ, Fourth, supra note 141, at 146.
205. 56 Wise. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). ~ note 131
supra. For a fuller discussion of the case ~ 86
Harv. L. Rev. 1582 (1973).
206. 56 Wise. 2d at 17, 201 N.W. 2d at 768.
207. 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1954).
208. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
209. 56 Wise. 2d at 21~22, 201 N.W.2d at 770.
210. 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1582, 1582-1592 (1973,).
211. CEQ, Fourth 146-47. In Mugler, 123 U.S. 623
(1887), the brewery owners were not compensated
when the sale of beer was made illegal.
...10J-
212. ~ Maine's site development law, note )8 supra,
and In re Spring V~11ey Deye1oPlnent, JOO A.2!Q 7)6,
746 (Me. 1973), quoted! at note 140 supra.
21). One court that has explici.tly recognized this fact
is the Qalifornia Supreme Court, which said in ~@rks y.
Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 p.2d 374, )80 (1971).
"The public uses' to which tidelands are SUbject
are SUfficiently flexible to encompass changing
pUblic needs. In administering the trust the
state is not burdened with an outmoded classifi ...
cation favoring one mode of utility over another.
There is a growing public recognition that
one of the most important public uses'of the
tidelands - a use encompassed within the tidelands
trust ... is the preservati,on of these lands in their
natural state ••.. n (footnote ,omitted).
214. Henry, supra note 180, at 190-91, 2,74.
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I V,. CONCLUSIONS
215. See text at, note 151 supra.
216. Although nominally part~time, tne Board of Environmental
Protection is a full-time body with a statutorily
mandated diverse membership, ~ note 53 supra.
217. Mass. ch. 130, 105 (1974). ~ text at notes
102...103 supra.
218. See text at note 101 supra.
219. 265 A.2d 71l (Me. 1970).
220. 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 197J)!
221. 1972 Mass. Ad. She l303, 284 N.E.2d 891, cert.
denied, 409 u.s. 1108 (1973).
222'. Conn. L.J. (Sup. ct.), Apr. 15, 1975, at 4.
223. 16 U.S.C.A. 1451-64 (1974).
224. ~ note 4 supra.
225. Testimony of Representative Morton, Maine
Hearings, supra note 151.
226. Teal, supra note 16, at 200.
